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Abstract 
This Briefing Paper examines the performance of the European Parliament (EP) in EU AFSJ 
law and policy-making from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until the end of the first 
half  of  2013.  The  paper  situates  the  EP  in  the  new  post-Lisbon  institutional  setting, 
documenting its transition to ‘AFSJ decision-maker’, and its new powers to shape and make 
policy covering the EU’s internal and external security agenda. While the paper finds that the 
EP  has  become  an  active  co-owner  of  the  EU  AFSJ  post-Lisbon,  with  the  Parliament 
demonstrating  a  dynamic  adjustment  to  its  new  post-Lisbon  role  and  powers,  the  authors 
identify a set of new developments and challenges that have arisen in the conduct of democratic 
accountability by the EP in the AFSJ since 2009, which call for critical reflection ahead of the 
new parliamentary term 2014-2019 and the post-2014 phase of the EU’s AFSJ. 
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Executive Summary 
The Lisbon Treaty finally brought parliamentary accountability and democratic scrutiny to the heart of the 
EU’s  Area  of  Freedom,  Security  and  Justice  (AFSJ),  recognising  the  European  Parliament  (EP)  as  co-
legislator across the spectrum of AFSJ policy issues and effectively formalising the role of the Parliamentary 
Committee responsible for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs – the LIBE Committee – as an ‘AFSJ 
decision-maker’,  with  new  powers  to  shape  and  make  policy  related  to  the  EU’s  internal  and  external 
security agenda. 
Assessment of the EP’s performance in EU AFSJ law and policy-making between 2009 and mid-2013 shows 
that Lisbon has brought about a ‘coming of age’ of the European Parliament as decision-maker and co-
owner of the EU’s AFSJ. During the 7
th Legislature, the LIBE Committee has demonstrated a dynamic 
adjustment  to  its  new  role  and  powers,  successfully  navigating  the  inter-institutional  decision-making 
processes and new institutional landscape post-Lisbon. LIBE’s contribution has materialised in concrete and 
visible inputs in the content of adopted EU AFSJ legislation, a higher degree of democratic scrutiny in EU 
AFSJ  cooperation,  and  the  development  of  new  working  methods  and  practices  in  the  conduct  of 
negotiations of complex legislative dossiers.  
However, the acquisition of its new Treaty-based powers and the adjustment to the role of co-owner of the 
EU’s AFSJ have been accompanied by a number of new developments and challenges. 
While the Treaties clearly position the EP at the heart of the AFSJ institutional design and decision-making, 
a number of controversies which have arisen between the EP and its institutional counterparts since 2009 
indicate that the prevailing mindsets in the Council and the Commission have not yet fully internalised 
the  full  scope  of  the  EP’s  new  authority.  Inter-institutional  disputes  on  issues  such  as  Schengen 
governance or EU-USA cooperation in the so-called “fight against terrorism” are visible examples of the 
Parliament’s struggle to have its authority recognised before the Council. These struggles have come in 
parallel with countervailing strategies for legitimation, as the EP has striven to be regarded by the 
Council and the Commission as a trusted and legitimate co-legislator and to neutralise past framings of 
the EP LIBE Committee as a fundamental rights advocate and ‘confrontational’ actor.  
The Parliament’s search for legitimacy in the AFSJ means that, while LIBE has been successful in adapting 
its  work  to  the  new  plural  inter-institutional  decision-making  processes  post-Lisbon,  the  Parliament  has 
displayed a tendency to adopt or internalise ways of working previously more characteristic of the Council or 
the Commission. This has manifested itself in a trend towards greater flexibility, informalities and early 
compromise agreements with the rotating Presidency and Council in the course of legislative procedures in 
parallel  with  an  increasing  ‘technocratisation’  and  a  degree  of  depolitisation  of  its  internal  working 
methods which has, at times, stood in tension with fundamental rights scrutiny, transparency and accountable 
decision-making. The struggle for legitimacy has therefore presented LIBE with a fundamental dilemma 
concerning  its  identity  both  as  co-legislator  on  AFSJ  (especially  security  policy)  and  watchdog  of 
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fundamental rights and democratic scrutiny. Against this background, evaluating the EP AFSJ legislative 
performance in a post-Lisbon setting cannot rely on the concept of a ‘responsible’ institutional partner that is 
solely aligned with a logic of efficiency and rapidity. Rather, it must take as its reference point LIBE’s 
recognised  competences  (as  laid  down  in  the  EP  Rules  of  Procedure)  to  ensure  democratic  scrutiny, 
proportionality and fundamental rights and which, by their very nature, imply controversy and confrontation 
as an essential ingredient of a healthy European democracy.  
Post-Lisbon, LIBE has gradually  acquired a role  as a ‘policy-setter’ through  the  adoption of own-
initiative reports and resolutions on important AFSJ-related subjects. Although the EP does not have a 
right  to  initiate  legislation  recognised  by  the  Treaties,  these  ‘policy-setting’  activities  have  enabled  the 
Parliament to come forward with its own policy initiatives and strategies on JHA. These have revealed, 
however, a number of follow-up and consistency shortcomings, not only with regard to the Parliament’s 
inter-institutional counterparts (in particular the European Commission), but also in relation to the EP’s own 
policy  and  legislative  work.  A  case  in  point  is  the  internal  policy  inconsistencies  generated  by  the 
establishment  and  activities  of  the  Special  Committee  on  Organised  Crime,  Corruption  and  Money 
Laundering (CRIM). 
Finally, the EP LIBE Committee has continued to play an important role as a promoter of fundamental rights 
and rule of law in EU AFSJ cooperation, partly driven by the post-Lisbon legally binding nature of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the EP’s new role in the shaping and making of EU security 
policies (police and criminal justice), have caused it to face similar dilemmas as regards fundamental 
rights protection to those which have long confronted the Council and the Commission. While the LIBE 
Committee relies on a number of instruments and safeguards to guarantee the fundamental rights monitoring 
of its own legislative work and that of the EP at large, the under-developed and fragmented nature of these 
tools limit their full and mainstream application during legislative procedures. 
The new set of developments and challenges identified for the LIBE Committee’s legislative and policy-
making activities post-Lisbon call for critical reflection and consideration ahead of the next phase of the 
EU’s AFSJ and the forthcoming institutional renewal of the EP and the European Commission in 2014. The 
EP’s LIBE Committee should take full ownership of the AFSJ policy and legislative agenda by seeking to 
consolidate its own ‘legislative and policy identity’ firmly anchored in its democratic accountability and 
fundamental  rights  mandate  and  tasks.  The  EP  should  find  innovative  ways  to  more  effectively  and 
consistently  implement  this  legislative  identity,  which  should  be  firmly  based  within  the  overarching 
framework of an internal horizontal ‘accountability, transparency and fundamental rights strategy’. THE ‘LISBONISATION’ OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  3 
 
1.  Introduction  
European  Union  policies  on  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  (JHA)  have  traditionally  presented  a  contested 
relationship with democratic accountability and legitimacy. Since its official kick-off 20 years ago, European 
cooperation in these domains has been of a predominantly intergovernmental and technocratic nature. JHA 
policy  has  been  driven  by  the  national  interests  of  member  states  and  the  Council,  developed  through 
unaccountable  and  secretive  ways  outside  the  remits  of  the  Community  method  of  cooperation  and 
parliamentary scrutiny at national and EU levels. The successive Treaty changes which have taken place 
since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty have striven to bring JHA, now denominated as the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ), policies gradually closer to the full toolkit of EU institutional, decisional and 
legal foundations composing the Union legal edifice, including the European Parliament’s accountability 
powers.  
One of the objectives of the Lisbon Treaty was to address the democratic and legitimacy challenges of the 
EU AFSJ. The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, repacked the previous Treaty 
framework  into  the  new  Treaty  on  European  Union  (TEU)  and  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European  Union  (TFEU).  The  expansion  of  the  co-decision  procedure,  now  called  ‘ordinary  legislative 
procedure’, to a large majority of AFSJ policy areas, and the scrapping of the First and Third Pillar divide in 
the Treaties, not only meant an injection of a higher degree of efficiency into EU decision-making. It also 
placed parliamentary accountability at the heart of the AFSJ foundations by formally recognising the 
European  Parliament  (EP)  as  co-legislator  in  areas  which,  until  then,  had  remained  reserved  under  the 
Council’s  remits  (police  and  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters)  as  well  as  in  the  conclusion  of 
international agreements in these domains.  
The  progressive  transition  towards  parliamentary  participation  coincided  with  the  first  steps  of  a  newly 
elected European Parliament since July 2009 (7
th Parliamentary Legislature). 2014 will be a decisive year 
for institutional renewal at the EU level, with the five-year mandate of the European Commission and the 
EP coming to an end and new European elections envisaged for May 2014. This will also coincide with the 
end of the five-year multi-annual programme in the EU’s AFSJ – the so-called ‘Stockholm Programme’ 
adopted by the European Council in 2009, which aimed at setting the AFSJ policy agenda between 2009-
2014 – and the start of negotiations towards the post-2014 EU policy and legislative programming strategy 
by the Council, the Commission and the EP. 
Questions related to democratic accountability and legitimacy of EU decision-making are also timely 
at European levels more generally in light of the ongoing period of economic instability. Decisions 
taken by the European Council to face the so-called ‘economic and financial crisis’ have received wide 
criticisms and concerns, not least by citizens across Europe who now see and experience the deep impact that 
decisions taken by European institutions have on their daily lives and more intimate liberties. Calls for a 
stronger degree of legitimacy and democratic scrutiny of executive and technocrat-driven decision-
making at the EU level are spreading across member states’ populations. It can be expected that the 
increasing  the  EU’s  incursion  into  AFSJ  legislation  may  potentially  face  similar  debates  in  the  future. 
Individuals become more aware of the effects that EU-level security policies may have over their personal 
rights, such as data protection or the presumption of innocence, when subject to law enforcement activities 
and criminal proceedings. The EP, directly representing the citizens of the Union,
1 is particularly well 
positioned to  meet some of these challenges  and  ensure that EU decisions “are taken as openly as 
possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.”
2  
This Briefing Paper examines the EP’s performance in EU AFSJ law- and policy-making from the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until the end of the first half of 2013. When speaking about the EP, 
particular attention is paid to the work carried out by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE), which has been entrusted with direct competence over a large majority of AFSJ policies and 
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law-making.  The  LIBE  Committee  has  since  become  one  of  the  most  dynamic  Committees  inside  the 
Parliament  with  regards  to  legislative  and  non-legislative  dossiers.  What  have  been  the  main  and  most 
significant developments in the conduct of democratic accountability by the LIBE Committee in the AFSJ? 
Which have been the main challenges and shortcomings affecting the performance of its attributed tasks and 
competences? And finally, what lessons can be learned for its future activities and the next 8
th Parliamentary 
Legislature?  
The Briefing Paper shows that the EP has become a co-owner of the EU AFSJ and actively performed its 
role as co-legislator. The acquisition of these new Treaty-based powers has not, however, been without a 
number of struggles for authority and legitimacy in its inter-institutional relations with the Council 
and the European Commission on issues as sensitive as EU-USA cooperation in the so-called ‘fight against 
terrorism’ or discussions on the Schengen governance regime. These cases have revealed most strikingly that 
while the Treaties clearly position the EP at the heart of the legitimacy of ‘the new EU institutional triangle’ 
and AFSJ decision-making, the mindset in the Council and the Commission might still have not fully 
envisaged and/or internalised the full reach and scope of the EP’s new authority in these domains. 
They have perhaps shown that the EP is also still finding its own ways and patterns of doing things in the 
building of its  new  identity  as co-legislator in  charge of  ensuring democratic  accountability in  the 
AFSJ,  while  taking  one  of  the  driving  seats  for  security-related  policy-making  together  with  the 
Council.  
Since the end of 2009, LIBE has been successful in adapting its work to the new plural inter-institutional 
decision-making processes and guaranteeing a higher degree of democratic scrutiny in EU AFSJ decision-
making. In this process, however, the Parliament has internalised the ways of working which had been used 
by the Council and the Commission in the former co-decision procedure as well as in the negotiations of 
international agreements. These have been driven by an ‘efficiency, technocracy and rapidity logic’ in the 
achievement  of  policy  results  and  compromises  that  was  not  used  to  democratic  controversy, 
transparency and critical debate (and potential disagreement) about their value added, necessity and 
impact on fundamental rights. The LIBE Committee had gained a rather artificial reputation as a liberal, 
progressive and civil libertarian (‘left wing’) actor, often critical of Council and member states’ security-
driven priorities and paying too much attention to fundamental rights and proportionality considerations of 
EU AFSJ policies. After Parliament acquired its new legislative authority in a majority of AFSJ domains 
following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it was increasingly pressured and called upon to behave 
‘responsibly’  and  ‘seriously’  and  therefore  take  a  more  ‘balanced’  and  nuanced  (non-controversial) 
approach, in line with the Council and Commission.  
This  has  created  a  dilemma  for  the  EP  and  its  LIBE  Committee.  It  has  led  to  greater  flexibility, 
informalities and early agreement compromises with the rotating Presidency and Council in the course of 
legislative procedures which have often come through increasing ‘technocratisation’ and a certain level of 
depolitisation  of  its  internal  working  methods  and  policy  outputs,  sometimes  to  the  detriment  of 
democracy, where room for controversy and disagreement with its inter-institutional colleagues has often 
remained limited in practice. Also, the construction of LIBE as ‘progressive’ or ‘left wing’ because of its 
focus on accountability and fundamental rights policy tradition is largely misleading. The Treaties and the 
EP Rules of Procedure expressly confer upon LIBE the responsibility to hold the Council and Commission 
accountable in AFSJ decision-making, and to protect fundamental rights as laid down in the Treaties and the 
now legally binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
That notwithstanding, and as a result of this process of adaptation, the EP’s own internal activities have 
been affected by accountability, transparency, consistency and even fundamental rights challenges. 
Also, the transition of the EP to co-legislator and an institutional actor in the making of EU security-related 
policies has forced it to confront very similar dilemmas to those it used to express concerns about when 
faced  by  the  Council  and  Commission.  The  EP  has  found  itself  immersed  in  working  methods  and 
philosophies where ‘rapidity’, ‘responsibility’, ‘pragmatism’ and ‘seriousness’ are the shared ‘rules of the 
game’ in negotiations. This has been accompanied by an increasing presence and ‘lobbying’ by member 
states’ permanent representations in Brussels, which are influencing and passing their national agendas on to 
Parliament’s internal work.  THE ‘LISBONISATION’ OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  5 
 
This Briefing Paper argues that these developments have too often played in favour of the Council, member 
states  and  the  European  Commission,  sometimes  at  the  expense  of  the  Parliament’s  scrutiny  and 
accountability roles. The EP should carefully plan and devise its own internal strategy towards the next 
phase of the EU’s AFSJ democratic accountability based on the challenges and lessons learned from its role 
as co-legislator and co-institutional owner of the EU AFSJ agenda. In the next phase of the EU’s AFSJ, the 
EP and its LIBE Committee should take full ownership of the AFSJ policy and legislative agenda by seeking 
to consolidate its own ‘legislative and policy identity’ and finding new/innovative ways of implementing 
more  effectively  and  consistently  its  own  legislative  identity  firmly  anchored  in  its  democratic 
accountability  tasks  and  fundamental  rights  powers.  Such  a  strategy  would  play  a  decisive  role  in 
strengthening  its  future  legitimacy  in  its  inter-institutional  relations  and  for  the  citizens  of  Europe.  The 
Briefing Paper recommends that the forthcoming parliamentary work and the post-2014 EP AFSJ agenda 
should be firmly based on an internal horizontal ‘accountability, transparency and fundamental rights 
strategy’. 
1.1  Structure and methodology 
After this brief introduction, Section 2 summarises the rocky road towards ‘Lisbonisation’ of the EU’s AFSJ 
and the progressive development and expansion of democratic accountability over EU JHA policy. The main 
changes and innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty to the role and functions of the EP are particularly 
highlighted. 
Section 3 assesses the main developments in the EP’s performance as regards legislative procedures in the 
scope of the ordinary legislative procedure, international agreements and policy programming in the EU’s 
AFSJ. It examines the progress made and main shortcomings/challenges affecting this set of Parliament’s 
activities. The Section focuses in particular on the following dimensions:  
First, the post-Lisbon Treaty period has led to the emergence of struggles for authority between the EP and 
Council and the European Commission; despite the formal enshrinement of the EP as co-legislator and equal 
institutional partner in the Treaties and inter-institutional agreements, the 7
th parliamentary legislature has 
witnessed a number of bitter battles between the three EU institutional actors which have been versed around 
the recognition of authority and legitimacy of the EP’s democratic accountability competences (Section 3.1).  
Second, the EP’s adaptation to the ordinary legislative procedure has also revealed an increasing use of early 
(first  reading)  agreements  and  informal  trilogues  with  the  rotating  Presidency  and  Council,  as  well  as 
informal ‘lobbying’ of member states’ governments and permanent representations. This system of fast-track 
law-making has not only transformed the ways in which the ordinary legislative procedure is supposed to 
work  ‘in  theory  and  practice’,  but  also  poses  challenges  from  the  perspective  of  accountability  and 
transparency of the EP’s own internal working methods (Section 3.2).  
Third, the EP has increasingly acted as a ‘policy setter and maker’ in AFSJ policies, with a large number of 
EU policy instruments and initiatives being enacted in own-initiative reports and resolutions during the last 
three years. These have, however, revealed a number of follow up and consistency shortcomings not only 
regarding its inter-institutional counterparts (in particular the European Commission), but also in its own 
policy and legislative work (Section 3.3).  
Fourth, the EP LIBE Committee has continued playing an important role as a promoter of fundamental rights 
and rule of law in EU AFSJ cooperation, partly driven by the post-Lisbon legally binding nature of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EP’s immersion in the ‘shaping’ and ‘making’ of EU security policies 
(police and criminal justice), however, has caused it to face similar dilemmas as regards fundamental rights 
protection to those confronting the Council and Commission. While the EP counts upon a number of internal 
procedures and mechanisms in house to guarantee compliance of its legislative work with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, these remain scattered, limited in scope and underdeveloped in nature (Section 3.4). 
Section 4 concludes and puts forward a set of policy recommendations for the next phases of democratic 
accountability in the current and post-2014 EU’s AFSJ. 6  CARRERA, HERNANZ & PARKIN  
 
An assessment such as the one requested in this Briefing Paper requires a carefully crafted methodological 
approach combining desk research and interviews. Our examination has included in-depth desk research of 
relevant primary and secondary sources. It has involved an assessment of ‘the state of knowledge’ in the 
scholarly literature on EU law, decision-making and institutional frameworks, with particular attention on the 
EP’s  role,  functions  and  contributions  to  democratic  accountability  and  legitimacy  in  the  European 
integration  process.  This  has  been  combined  with  an  analysis  of  the  literature  in  political  sciences, 
international political sociology and law covering the EU AFSJ (see the list of References Sources for this 
paper). Our research method has also included an assessment of relevant EP AFSJ legislative and policy 
instruments from the end of 2009 until mid-2013, as well as any relevant jurisprudence involving the EP and 
the AFSJ before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg. The authors have also 
analysed statistics on legislative and non-legislative dossiers during the 7th Legislature of the EP and would 
like to express their gratitude to the Secretariat of the LIBE Committee for the provision of the statistical 
information. Desk research has been combined with a set of semi-structured interviews with a selection of 
MEPs (representing all the main political groups inside the EP), the LIBE Committee Chair, the Head of 
Unit of the LIBE Secretariat, as well as a number of political advisers and administrations who have been 
actively engaged in key legislative and policy files and debates in the EP, and presenting both a pre- and 
post-Lisbon Treaty experience/knowledge of the EP’s role in the EU’s AFSJ.  
For the purposes of this Briefing Paper, a selective  and targeted approach was deemed  necessary when 
assessing the EP’s post-Lisbon Treaty performance in the AFSJ. The EP’s roles and functions are complex 
and multifaceted in nature and scope. Regarding the AFSJ-relevant aspects, these now include legislative, 
policy,  supervisory  and  budgetary  powers  as  well  as  relations  with  national  parliaments.  Our  analysis 
primarily focuses on the legislative and policy-shaping/setting powers that Parliament has acquired 
and developed since the Lisbon Treaty till the end of the first half of 2013. More research will still be 
needed when examining the full range of EP LIBE Committee tasks and activities, in particular the EP 
supervisory and budgetary roles in AFSJ-related matters, as well as its full performance to mid-2014. The 
Lisbon Treaty granted national parliaments with the responsibility to take part in the evaluation of AFSJ 
policies and agencies (e.g. Europol and Eurojust), to develop a greater control of national governments on 
their  EU  strategies  on  these  domains  and  to  ensure  a reinforced  control  mechanism  of  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity.  However,  an  evaluation  of  the  ways  in  which  national  parliaments  have  performed  and 
implemented their Treaty powers in the AFSJ, and their cooperation with the LIBE Committee, falls outside 
the scope of this Briefing Paper.  
2.  The European Parliament and the AFSJ: The Rocky Road Towards Democratic 
Accountability 
Over the past two decades, the EP’s role and activities in the EU AFSJ have experienced a progressive 
evolution and mutation, not least for the EP’s LIBE Committee which, since its establishment in 1992, has 
evolved into one of the most important and paradigmatic Standing Committees in Parliament. Understanding 
the developments of the EP’s powers in AFSJ cooperation and the way in which these have influenced the 
identity and legislative and policy practices of the LIBE Committee after the Lisbon Treaty is a critical 
preliminary step in situating and assessing the wider progress of this institutional player in a post-Lisbon 
Treaty institutional landscape.  
As this section will demonstrate, the so-called ‘Lisbonisation’
3 of the EP in respect of the EU AFSJ took 
place some time before 2009. In fact, the EP LIBE Committee started to perform the role as co-legislator 
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on the Communication from the Commission on the Commission Work Programme 2011, 2012/C 169 E/05. There is 
not a commonly agreed definition of this notion. It is generally understood as comprising the changes brought by the 
Lisbon Treaty, in particular when referring to the innovations introduced by the Title V (Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Articles 67-89). The term has been also used 
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from 2005 in some of these policy domains, when the Council decided to transfer a majority of the areas 
covered by the former EU First Pillar (with the exception of ‘legal migration’) to the co-decision procedure. 
The  most  far-reaching  innovation  introduced  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  concerned  the  expansion  of  the 
Community method of cooperation to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and the granting to 
the EP of a binding say (consent) in the conclusion of international agreements on the external dimensions of 
the EU AFSJ. 
The first formalised steps in European cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) began after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 when the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and its so-
called ‘Third Pillar’ (Title VI, Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs, Article 
K) introduced JHA as a new policy domain into the Union’s wider integration process and formally 
opened  the  gates  for  EU  cooperation  in  these  areas.  However,  JHA  policy-making  continued  to  be 
characterised  by  a  predominantly  intergovernmental,  obscure  and  inefficient  framework.  The  European 
Parliament remained, by and large, marginalised in the legislative process, something which led the literature 
to underline the ‘democratic deficit’ affecting EU JHA policies.
4 Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty (Article 
K.6.2 TEU) stipulated that the Presidency and Commission should regularly inform the EP of discussions 
held on JHA areas and stated that the Presidency “shall” consult the EP on the principal aspects of JHA 
activities and “ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration”. The 
same article also allowed the EP to ask questions or make recommendations to the Council.  
To  oversee  these  new,  albeit  limited,  competences  in  JHA,  the  EP  decided  to  establish  in  1992  a  full 
Parliamentary Committee  for ‘Civil Liberties and Internal  Affairs’ – the first official incarnation  of the 
Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Initially, the Committee’s activities and 
tasks  were  significantly  limited  by  the  intergovernmental  framework  which  then  governed  the  JHA 
legislative process. Nevertheless, LIBE was from the outset characterised by two core components that 
progressively enabled the Committee to leverage its influence and role in the EU policy-making spheres. 
The first was the Committee’s role and mandate to protect and promote fundamental rights within the 
EU;
5 the second was the strategic activism employed by LIBE as the Committee struggled to have its 
role recognised and its accountability competences strengthened and properly implemented in JHA 
cooperation.  
LIBE’s efforts to gain authority during the Maastricht Treaty were primarily channelled towards realising the 
practical application of its ‘right of information’.
6 Simultaneously, LIBE turned its attention to stimulating 
                                                                                                                                                                         
of police and criminal justice cooperation and which are subject to Protocol 36 on ‘Transitional Provisions’ (Title VII, 
Article 10) of the Lisbon Treaty, which comes to an end in December 2014. For the purposes of this Briefing Paper 
‘Lisbonisation’ is understood and used as mainly referring to the changes implied the Lisbon Treaty reform for the 
competences and powers of the EP in respect of the EU AFSJ, and in particular the expansion of the Community 
method of cooperation and recognition of its power to consent in international agreements.  
4 E. Guild, S. Carrera and T. Balzacq (2010), “The Changing Dynamics of Security in an Enlarged European Union”, in 
D. Bigo, S. Carrera, E. Guild and R.B.J. Walker (eds), Europe’s 21
st Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty, Ashgate 
Publishing, pp. 31-48; J. Apap and M. Anderson (2002), Striking a Balance between Freedom, Security and Justice in 
an Enlarged European Union, CEPS paperback, Brussels; T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (2005), Migration, Borders and 
Asylum: Trends and Vulnerabilities in EU Policy, CEPS paperback, Brussels; T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds) (2006), 
Security  versus  Freedom:  A  Challenge  for  Europe’s  Future?,  Aldershot:  Ashgate  Publishing;  S.  Lavanex  (2010), 
“Justice and Home Affairs: Communitarisation with Hesitation”, in H. Wallace, M. A. Pollack and A. R. Young (2010), 
Policy Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 457-477. 
5 LIBE’s mandate in fundamental rights was formally embedded in Article K2 of the Maastricht Treaty which provided 
that: “The matters referred to in Article K.1 shall be dealt with in compliance with the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and having regard to the protection afforded by member states to persons persecuted on 
political grounds.”
 
6 The contestations around realising the Parliament’s right to be consulted in certain key JHA matters were first evident 
in the controversy over the Council’s failure to consult the Parliament over the Europol Convention which led the LIBE 
Committee to issue a Resolution in May 1995 emphasising that “in the context of cooperation between member states, 8  CARRERA, HERNANZ & PARKIN  
 
the political debate around JHA,
7 giving particular consideration to the protection  of fundamental rights 
within the EU. One of the earliest initiatives by the new Committee was to produce LIBE’s first annual 
report on respect for human rights in the Community, followed by a Resolution on the subject on 11 March 
1993.
8 Subsequent annual reports on fundamental rights were used by the LIBE Committee as an opportunity 
to  advocate  and  widen  the  political  debate  on  key  fundamental  rights-based  priorities,  including  the 
accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights.
9  
The adoption in 1999 of the Amsterdam Treaty constituted a further step towards the recognition of the 
EP  as  an  institutional  player  in  JHA  when  domains  related  to  immigration,  asylum,  visas  and  other 
policies related to the free movement of persons were transferred to the Community sphere or cooperation 
method under the former ‘First Pillar’ (former Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC)). Policies dealing with police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained under the 
‘EU Third Pillar’ (former Title VI of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)), however, and continued to 
be governed by an intergovernmental decision-making procedure which required the Council only ‘to 
consult’ the European Parliament before adopting any measure referred to in Article 34.2.b, c and d TEU.
10 
Although with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 the LIBE Committee now had the right 
to be formally consulted on all legislative AFSJ acts, the application of the so-called co-decision procedure 
(then envisaged in Article 251 TEC) with regard to the ‘communitarised’ AFSJ fields would only come into 
effect after a transition period of five years. In the meantime, and as De Capitani has contended,  
faced with the ambitious but fragile perspectives opened by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European 
Parliament  decided to become a driving force  in shaping the  future EU action in the freedom, 
security and justice area and by turning the other community and Union policies into a tool to 
promote and not only protect fundamental rights.
11  
Such efforts were visible in 2000 when the EP followed the European Commission in calling for the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights to become legally binding
12 and used the Charter as a template for its annual reviews 
of the fundamental rights situation in the EU and a reference point in reports, resolutions and parliamentary 
questions.
13 
With the end of the transitional period instituted by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 2005, the LIBE Committee 
saw  major  developments  in  its  institutional  structure  as  co-decision  was  extended  to  asylum,  irregular 
immigration, data protection, borders and visas and civil law cooperation (exceptions included cooperation in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Parliament  will  increasingly  have  to  assume  parliamentary  scrutiny  functions.”  See  European  Parliament,  Second 
Report  on Europol,  Committee  on  Civil  Liberties  and  Internal  Affairs,  29.2.96,  A4-0061/96  PE  215.803  fin., and 
amended Resolution, adopted 14.3.96. Refer to J. Monar (2012), ‘Justice and Home Affairs: The Treaty of Maastricht 
as a Decisive Intergovernmental Gate Opener,’ Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, No. 7, p. 730.
 
7  E.  De  Capitani  (2011),  “The  Evolving  Role  of  the  European  Parliament”,  in  J.  Monar  (ed),  The  Institutional 
Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels, Peter Lang.
 
8 OJ C 115, 26.4.1993.
 
9 OJ C44, 1994, p.32. Repeated reiteration by the Parliament of its call for the Community’s accession to the ECHR, 
prompted the Council to request the formal opinion of the Court of Justice on April 26th 1994. See Opinion 2/94.
 
10 As laid down in Article 39 TEU. 
11  E.  De  Capitani  (2011),  “The  Evolving  Role  of  the  European  Parliament”,  in  J.  Monar  (ed.)  The  Institutional 
Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels, Peter Lang.
 
12  Resolution  on  the  impact  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  and  its  future  status 
(2002/2139(INI)), P5_TA(2002)0508.
 
13 The LIBE Committee was also an early supporter of the idea to establish a fundamental rights agency, proposing in 
2000 to set up a network of independent experts as a preparatory measure and calling on the Commission in 2005 to 
submit a legislative proposal for the full establishment of an EU agency dedicated to fundamental rights oversight. E. 
De Capitani (2011), “The Evolving Role of the European Parliament”, in J. Monar (ed.) The Institutional Dimension of 
the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels, Peter Lang.
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the  area  of  legal  migration).
14  These  developments  immediately  increased  the  LIBE  Committee’s 
standing  in  the  European  Parliament  as  a  co-legislative  player.  However,  even  as  the  European 
Parliament was taking its place in the AFSJ, a counter-current was presenting the EP as a ‘controversial’ 
and ‘progressive’ co-legislator.  
LIBE’s tradition and efforts to implement its mandate on fundamental rights and the rule of law and to fulfil 
its responsibility to hold the Commission and Council (and the EU AFSJ decision-making process) more 
accountable  and  transparent  had  earned  the  Committee  an  artificial  reputation  within  some  EU  policy 
spheres as ‘libertarian’, ‘confrontationally left-wing’ and in danger of applying a certain ‘radicalism’ to the 
previously intergovernmental and member-states-driven EU legislative process.
15 This construction played 
into discourses around the validity of the EP’s role as a ‘trustworthy’ and ‘legitimate’ co-legislator in the 
AFSJ inter-institutional setting, which became more pertinent with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The  academic  literature  even  engaged  in  assessing  the  extent  to  which  ‘liberal’  EP  policy  positions  or 
behaviours had shifted towards more ‘security-friendly’ and ‘less confrontational’ positions classically held 
by member states and the Council in light of examples such as the so-called ‘Returns Directive’.
16 
This reputation of the Parliament was largely misleading and is not helpful when seeking to gain a 
better  understanding  of  the  EP  AFSJ  legislative  performance  in  a  post-Lisbon  Treaty  setting. 
Fundamental rights have been, and currently are, a key component in the LIBE’s mandate, representing an 
essential ingredient of the ‘accountability’ that the Committee has been entrusted to deliver in light of its 
Rules of Procedure, and have little to do with ‘left’ or ‘right’ political ideologies. To frame the Committee as 
more ‘left wing’ or ‘good’ because it is fundamental rights-friendly cannot be accepted. ‘Confrontation’, 
understood  as  political  controversy  resulting  from  transparent  and  accountable  decision-making,  also 
constitutes an essential ingredient of healthy democracy rooted in the rule of law. Scrutiny of executive and 
intergovernmental decisions is not meant to be ‘non-confrontational’. Here also, an ideological framing is 
not helpful and remains too simplistic when seeking a proper understanding the actual issues at stake to 
assess the role of LIBE Committee as co-legislator in the EU’s AFSJ. The stereotypical framing of the EP 
LIBE  Committee  as  a  fundamental  rights  advocate  and  ‘confrontational’  actor  contributed  to  the  EP 
adapting  to  the  Council  and  Commission’s  working  methods  and  patterns  of  decision-making 
behaviour of efficiency, flexibility and rapidity which, as we argue in Section 3 below, form a difficult 
relationship with accountability, transparency and fundamental rights. 
The EP ‘authority-seeking strategy’ still continued during the Amsterdam Treaty integration phase. 
This was, for instance, reflected in a number of EP Resolutions adopted after the Treaty of Amsterdam,
17 
where Parliament reiterated concerns about: First, the lack of transparency in the Council’s legislative 
debates; second, the  insufficient  involvement and  non-systematic consultation  of the EP in  international 
                                                   
14 Council Decision 22 December 2004 providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty, OJ 2004 
L396/45. 
15 A. Ripoll Servent (2011), “Playing the Codecision Game? Rules’ Changes and Institutional Adaptation at the LIBE 
Committee”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 55-73.  
16 Refer to Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008. 
See D. Acosta (2009), “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law: Is the European Parliament Becoming 
Bad and Ugly? (The Adoption of Directive 2008/15: The Returns Directive)”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 
Vol. 11, pp. 19-39. See also A. Ripoll Servent (2011), “Co-Decision in the European Parliament: Comparing Rationalist 
and Constructivist Explanations of the Returns Directive”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
pp. 3-22. 
17 See as a way of illustration European Parliament, Resolution on the future of the area of freedom, security and justice 
as well as on the measures required to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness thereof (2004/2175(INI)), 29 September 
2004. European Parliament resolution of 25 September 2008 on the annual debate on the progress made in 2007 in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) (Articles 2 and 39 of the EU Treaty), P6_TA(2008)0458. See points E 
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agreements on judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police and the wider EU's external strategy in the 
AFSJ;
18 third, the non-involvement of the EP fully and in good time in the drafting and updating of the 
legislative and operational programme in the AFSJ; and fourth, the existence of outstanding deficits in the 
promotion and safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms through policies linked to the AFSJ. These are 
all elements that the EP considered of fundamental importance when ensuring democratic legitimacy and 
legal certainty in AFSJ decision-making processes. To this we can add the use of litigation before the Court 
in Luxembourg which resulted in several landmark cases (as shown in Annex 2). 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  constituted  a  decisive  recasting  of  the  institutional,  decision-making  and  legal 
configurations  at  the  foundations  of  the  EU’s  AFSJ  of  which  the  European  Parliament  and  national 
parliaments were seen as the main beneficiaries.
19 Lisbon’s principal innovations included the scrapping of 
the First and Third pillar division which characterised JHA policies under the Amsterdam Treaty framework 
and the expansion of the Community method of cooperation as a ‘general rule’ subject to few exceptions. 
The formal abolition of the legal duality of the (First/Third) pillar approach represented a major step forward, 
finally  bringing  police  and  criminal  justice  cooperation  under  the  remit  of  the  Community  method  of 
cooperation  and  common  Title  V  named  ‘Area  of  Freedom,  Security  and  Justice’  in  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union.
20  
The  Treaty  of  Lisbon  extended  co-decision,  later  to  be  re-christened  “ordinary  legislative  procedure”, 
enshrining  the  EP  as  co-legislator  in  areas  previously  reserved  for  EU  member  states’  governments,  in 
particular legal migration and the majority of policies on criminal law and policing. The ‘unanimity rule’ 
inside the Council was maintained for a number of policy issues considered to be particularly sensitive.
21 In 
the majority of these cases, the EP is simply consulted, while in others it has a new power of consent. This is 
the case, for example, for Article 86.1 on the European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO) where ‘special 
legislative procedures’ will apply. The EP also acquired the power to have binding say in the conclusion of 
international  agreements  on  JHA.  According  to  Article  218  (6)  (a)  –  (v)  of  the  TFEU,  the  consent 
(formerly  known  as  ‘the  assent  procedure’)  of  the  EP  is  now  required  for  any  international  agreement 
                                                   
18 The EP specifically called the Council Presidency and the Commission to consult it “in respect of each international 
agreement based on Articles 24 and 38 TEU when the agreements affect the fundamental rights of Union citizens and 
the main aspects of judicial and police cooperation with third countries or international organizations”, and to keep the 
EP informed of negotiations on agreements covering the AFSJ, and to ensure that the EP’s views were “duly taken into 
consideration, as provided for by Articles 39 and 21 TEU and by Article 300 TEC”. Refer to Point 2 of the 2007 
Resolution on an area of freedom, security and justice: Strategy on the external dimension, Action Plan implementing 
the Hague programme. 
19 Addressing the democratic accountability of the EU’s AFSJ  was one of the priorities during the debates of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. Working Group X on Freedom, Security and Justice (Convention on the Future of 
Europe), called for the ‘de-pillarisation’ and the incorporation of the old-Third Pillar into the main body of the Treaties, 
which considered ‘democratic control’ to be of central importance in the establishment of a common Area of Freedom, 
Security  and  Justice  (http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/reg/en/02/cv00/cv00426.en02.pdf).  See  Monar,  J. (2005), 
“Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty. What Added Value for the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice?”, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 1, No, 2, pp. 226-246. 
20 Title V is composed by the following Chapters: Chapter 1 (General Provisions); Chapter 2 (Policies on Border 
Checks, Asylum and Immigration); Chapter 3 (Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters), Chapter 4 (Judicial Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters), and Chapter 5 (Police Cooperation). For an analysis of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty 
on  AFSJ  policies  refer  to  S.  Carrera  and  F.  Geyer  (2008),  “The  Reform  Treaty  and  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  – 
Implications for the common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, in E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds), Security versus 
Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 289–307. See also 
de Zwaan, J. (2011), “The New Governance of Justice and Home Affairs: Towards Further Supranationalism”, in S. 
Wolff, F.A.N.J. Goudappel and J.W. de Zwaan (eds), Freedom, Security and Justice after Lisbon and Stockholm, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, pp. 7-25. 
21 Article 86.1 on the European Public Prosecutor (EPPO), Article 87.3 on police operations, Article 89 on cross-border 
police operations, Article 81.3 on family law and Article 77.3 on passports. THE ‘LISBONISATION’ OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  11 
 
covering areas within the scope of the ordinary legislative procedure.
22 The EP is “now in a strong position 
to insist politically that its views be taken into account during the definition of the negotiating mandate by 
the Council and during negotiations themselves”.
23 
The  resulting  picture  is  one  where  the  EP  LIBE  Committee
24  is  responsible  for  the  legislation  and 
democratic oversight of the full range of policies linked to the construction of the EU AFSJ, including non-
discrimination policy, data protection, free movement, asylum, migration and borders as well as judicial 
cooperation in civil matters, and, for the first time in the history of European integration, police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. By becoming co-legislator over security-related (i.e. old Third Pillar-related) 
policy areas, and giving the EP a binding say in the conclusion of international agreements on JHA, the 
Lisbon Treaty effectively formalises the role of the LIBE Committee as an ‘AFSJ decision-maker’, 
with new powers to shape and make policy related to the EU’s internal and external security agenda. This 
role  is  in  addition  to  LIBE’s  tasks  on  fundamental  rights  protection.  One  of  the  Committee’s  key 
responsibilities as laid down in the EP Rules of Procedure is stated as “the protection within the territory of 
the Union of citizens’ rights, human rights and fundamental rights, including the protection of minorities, as 
laid down in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”
25 What have 
been the main developments and challenges in the conduct of these democratic accountability tasks by 
the LIBE Committee in the AFSJ?  
3.  Delivering Democratic Scrutiny to EU AFSJ Decision-Making:  
Developments, Progress and Challenges In the EP 
This section examines the main developments in, progress made and challenges characterising the delivery 
of democratic accountability by the EP in the making of the EU’s AFSJ from the arrival of the Lisbon Treaty 
until mid-2013. It assesses the ways in which the LIBE Committee has so far handled the transition towards 
co-owner of AFSJ policy- and law-making, while maintaining its responsibilities for democratic oversight 
and fundamental rights scrutiny in the ‘EU institutional triangle’.
26 It starts by assessing some of the main 
controversies and tensions experienced by the EP in its acquired role as legislative co-owner of the AFSJ 
(Section 3.1). The analysis then moves to the various ways in which the Parliament has adapted itself to the 
ordinary  legislative  procedure  and  the  expansion  of  the  Community  method  of  cooperation  to  a  large 
majority of AFSJ policy areas, including the police and criminal justice (Section 3.2). The role of the EP as 
‘policy setter and maker’ in AFSJ-related policies is studied in Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 moves onto 
assessing the relationship between the EP’s legislative and policy tasks and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 
                                                   
22 In this case, “The European Parliament and the Council may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time-limit for 
consent”. Moreover, the provision expressly states that: “(b) after consulting the European Parliament in other cases. 
The European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a time-limit which the Council may set depending on the 
urgency of the matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time-limit, the Council may act.” 
23 R. Corbett (2012), “The Evolving Roles of the European Parliament and of National Parliaments”, in A. Biondi, P. 
Eeckhout and S. Ripley, EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford University Press, pp. 248-261. 
24 See the LIBE Committee website at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/home.html  
25 See www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getLastRules.do?language=EN&reference=TOC. The Committee is also entrusted 
with oversight of the EU Home Affairs agencies and for determining the “clear risk of a serious breach by a member 
state of the principles common to the member states.” 
26 This term refers to the status that the EP has acquired and practiced in its relations to the Commission and the 
Council. P. Craig and G. De Búrca (2011), EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press. 
Refer also to R. Corbett, F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton (2007), The European Parliament, Harper, 7
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3.1  The European Parliament as co-legislator: Struggles for authority and legitimacy 
A  number  of  bitter  battles  have  arisen  between  the  EP,  the  Commission  and  the  Council  since  the 
implementation of the new post-Lisbon AFSJ institutional design. Among those areas which have been the 
source of inter-institutional disputes, two policy issues have proved to be particularly contentious: EU-US 
cooperation on data processing for the purposes of the so-called ‘fight against terrorism’, and legislative 
developments reforming the Schengen borders system. How should we understand these inter-institutional 
controversies?  Close  consideration  of  the  institutional  tensions  arising  from  these  domains  indicates  a 
‘juggling act’ being performed by the EP LIBE Committee as its wrestles with the dynamics of defining its 
authority while fighting to have its legitimacy acknowledged as a responsible and equal co-legislator by its 
institutional counterparts.  
3.1.1  The SWIFT, PNR and Schengen affairs  
The topics of EU-US data processing and Schengen offer instructive illustrations, not only because they have 
sparked the strongest confrontations between the European institutions since 2009, but also because they 
crystallise a new shift in the inter-institutional dynamics between the EP, the Council and the Commission in 
AFSJ cooperation.   
The first such controversy arose with the EP’s voting down of the 2010 Swift Agreement between the EU 
and the US.
27 The interim agreement, which aimed to give a legal basis for US requests for European data 
on financial transactions (within the scope of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program - TFTP), was the 
first  time  the  EP  had  the  opportunity  to  make  use  of  its  new  powers  under  Lisbon  to  veto  specific 
international agreements. The EP chose to put its new powers into  effect by rejecting the agreement  in 
February 2010 based on concerns over privacy, proportionality and reciprocity.
28 It was furthermore reported 
that parliamentarians were angry at the way the EU had negotiated the deal, without consulting or informing 
the EP at critical stages of the negotiation process.
29 The  vote came as a shock to the Council and the 
Commission, but the Parliament itself was unequivocal. In the words of the former President Buzek,  
The European Parliament's concerns on the use of data have not been fully met.... The Lisbon Treaty 
... has given MEPs a right of veto over international agreements of this kind. The same governments 
must  accept  that  the  European  Parliament  will  use  this  power  in  a  way  which  reflects  its  own 
assessment of the concerns of Europe's citizens.
 30 (Emphasis added). 
However,  the  EP’s  rejection  of  the  agreement  was  quickly  followed  by  a  renegotiated  EU–US  TFTP 
agreement that was approved by the EP only four months later, after it negotiated several safeguards with the 
Council and US Treasury Department.
31 Despite the EP’s input into the revised deal, the principal concerns 
that  the  Parliament  had  originally  raised  remained  largely  unaddressed.
32  Indeed,  the  EU-US  TFTP 
agreement  has  since  drawn  criticism  for  not  doing  enough  to  ensure  the  independent  oversight  of  data 
exchanges between the EU and the US (the EP having compromised on its initial insistence in having a 
                                                   
27  European  Parliament  legislative  resolution  of  11  February  2010  on  the  Proposal  for  a  Council  decision  on  the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes  of the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program (05305/1/2010 REV 1 – C7-0004/2010 – 2009/0190(NLE)). 
28 European Parliament Press Release  “SWIFT: European Parliament votes down agreement with the US” 11 February 
2010. 
29 S. Pignal, “European parliament rejects US data swap deal”, Financial Times, 11 February 2010.  
30 European Parliament Press Release, “EP President Jerzy Buzek on the rejection of the SWIFT interim agreement by 
the European Parliament” 11 February 2010. 
31 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the EU to the US for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ L 195/5, 27.7.2010. 
See also the European Parliament Press Release, ‘Parliament gives green light for SWIFT II,’ 08.07.2010. 
32 See A. Amicelle (2011) “The Great (Data) Bank Robbery: Terrorist Finance Tracking Program and the “SWIFT 
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public “judicial” body responsible for receiving requests rather than Europol, as was finally agreed).
 A report 
on the inspection of the first six months of Europol’s work by its own Joint Supervisory Body, published in 
2011,
33  concluded  that  data  protection  was  not  ensured  in  light  of  several  oral  requests  from  the  US 
Department of Treasury. Several MEPs interviewed for the purposes of this paper remain similarly sceptical 
about the respect of data protection rules regarding the private data of EU citizens that are sent ‘in bulk’ to 
the US.  
In addition, concerns related to the EU-US TFTP Agreement, and its implementation, are amplified by a lack 
of  access  for  the  EP  to  classified  documents  that  considerably  reduces  the  information  available  to 
monitoring authorities and its scrutiny powers. The EP was also denied access to a document drafted by the 
Council’s Legal Service,  which  was challenged in  front  of the Court of Justice  of the European  Union 
(CJEU).
34  Thus  while  the  EP  succeeded  in  having  an  input  into  the  revised  text  of  the  international 
agreement, it was ready to accept the second compromise agreement even though it did not represent a 
significant improvement in terms of fundamental rights, accountability and transparency.  
A similar scenario is depicted in the controversy that surrounded the EP’s approval of the EU-US PNR 
Agreement in April 2012.
35 The agreement, which covered the transfer of Passenger Name Records (PNRs) 
– personal data of passengers stored by airlines – to the US, was to replace a 2007 PNR agreement that had 
been provisionally applied since the CJEU annulled a 2004 PNR agreement following an action brought by 
the EP on data protection grounds.
36 In April 2012, the EP approved the new PNR agreement in a vote which 
proved so controversial that the rapporteur, MEP Sophie In’t Veld, withdrew her name from the report in 
protest  that  the  final  vote  failed  to  respect  the  EP’s  recommendations.
37  In’t  Veld  contended  that  the 
agreement left serious data protection concerns, including concerns over the data retention period (15 years), 
compliance with the purpose limitation principle and the use of sensitive data for profiling or data-mining – 
all elements which were similarly criticised by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).
38  
The pattern of the EU-US PNR agreement therefore took a similar shape to the EU-US TFTP deal. While the 
Parliament succeeded in inserting certain improvements, it nevertheless gave its consent to an agreement 
where the most serious sources of concern – principally those affecting fundamental rights – remained in 
place and largely open.
39   
Schengen – one of the most important and symbolic policy areas in the AFSJ – has also been at the heart of 
controversy during the 7
th Parliamentary Legislature. Unlike the above examples of tensions surrounding 
international agreements, Schengen and border controls were ‘communitarised’ several years before Lisbon 
and therefore it may be surprising that this domain has been the source of new inter-institutional disputes 
                                                   
33 See Europol Joint Supervisory Body, Report on the Inspection of Europol’s Implementation of the TFTP Agreement, 
Conducted in November 2010 by the Europol Joint Supervisory Body, JSB/Ins. 11-07, Brussels, March 2011. 
34 See Case T-529/09 Sophie In’t Veld v Council, 4 May 2012. 
35 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of passenger name 
records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, OJ L 215/5, 11.8.2012; J. Faull and L. Soreca (2008), 
“EU-US Relations in Justice and Home Affairs” in B. Martenczuk and S. van Thiel (eds) Justice, Liberty and Security: 
New Challenges for EU External Relations, Brussels, VUB Press. 
36 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, Parliament v. Council, [2006] ECR-I 4721. 
37 See European Parliament (2010) Resolution of 5 May 2010 on the launch of negotiations for Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) agreements with the United States, Australia and Canada, P7_TA(2010)0144, as well as European Parliament 
(2010) Resolution of 11 November 2010 on the global approach to transfers of passenger name record (PNR) data to 
third  countries,  and  on  the  recommendations  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  to  authorise  the  opening  of 
negotiations between the European Union and Australia, Canada and the United States, P7_TA(2010)0397. 
38 The EDPS listed the 15-year retention period, the purpose limitation and the inclusion of sensitive data as elements of 
concerns in its opinion - see European Data Protection Supervisor (2011) Press Release EDPS/12/11, Brussels, 13 
December 2011. 
39 See also J. Santos Vara (2013), ‘The role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of the transatlantic agreements 
on the transfer of personal data after Lisbon’, CLEER Working Papers 2013/2.  14  CARRERA, HERNANZ & PARKIN  
 
since 2009, most notably in the form of the so-called ‘Schengen Freeze’.
40 The controversy arose over the 
decision in 2012 by the Danish Presidency, endorsed by the JHA Council, to unilaterally change the legal 
basis of the Commission’s proposed Regulation for a new Schengen evaluation mechanism.
41 The move, 
effectively excluding the EP mid-way through a legislative procedure, revealed a pre-Lisbon mindset among 
member states in the Council, as did the Council’s legislative amendments that significantly watered down 
the ‘Union-focused’ nature of the Schengen Governance Package.
42 
While the reticence  displayed by the Council  over the Schengen Governance Package  was nothing new 
(reluctance to share EU decision-making powers in AFSJ demonstrates continuity with the pre-Lisbon era), 
what  is  new  is  the  response  of  the  EP.  The  change  of  legal  basis  by  the  Council  after  two  years  of 
negotiations  was  perceived  as  an  act  of  provocation  by  the  Parliament  which  responded  by  taking  the 
unprecedented decision to suspend or ‘freeze’ cooperation on on-going JHA dossiers.
43 This, together with 
the  threats  to  resort  to  litigation  before  the  CJEU  in  official  EP  statements  and  press  releases,  was  an 
unequivocal show of force by the Parliament’s Conference of Presidents.
44 Indeed, the decision by the 
Conference of Presidents to freeze all ‘security’ files was widely held
45 to be very efficient in facilitating the 
conclusion of an agreement  with the Council that resulted  in the EP achieving a ‘de facto  co-decision’ 
arrangement.  A formal  declaration  was agreed by the Council, stating that any change to the Schengen 
Evaluation Mechanism would be subject to consultation with the EP.
46 
A similar readiness by the Parliament to  demand full recognition  of its authority and competences  was 
evident in the successful action brought by the EP before the CJEU in 2010 annulling the Council Decision 
2010/252  governing  sea  surveillance  by  the  EU  border  agency  Frontex  (including  rescue  at  sea  and 
disembarkation of migrants).
47 The EP contested the Decision on the basis that it ought to have been 
adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure and not by the ‘comitology’ procedure (based on Article 12) of 
                                                   
40 European Parliament Press Release, ‘EP decides to suspend cooperation with Council on five JHA dossiers until 
Schengen question is resolved’, 14.06.2012. 
41 Commission proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the 
application of the Schengen acquis, COM(2011)559, 16.09.2011, Brussels. 
42 Commission proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the 
application  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  COM(2011)559, 16.09.2011,  Brussels;  Commission  proposal  for  a  Regulation 
amending Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of 
border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances, COM(2011)560, 16.09.2011, Brussels; Council of the 
EU  (2013)  Draft  consolidated  compromise  text  -  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  on  the  establishment  of  an 
evaluation mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, Council Document 10273/13, Brussels, 30 May 
2013; European Parliament (2013) Position adopted at first reading on 12 June 2013 with a view to the adoption of 
Regulation (EU) No .../2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in 
order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional 
circumstances, P7_TC1-COD(2011)0242, Strasbourg, 12 June 2013. For an assessment of the Schengen Governance 
Package  refer  to  S.  Carrera  (2011),  An  Assessment  of  the  Commission’s  2011  Schengen  Governance  Package: 
preventing abuse  by EU member states of freedom  of movement?” CEPS Liberty and Security Series, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
43 The five dossiers concerned were: Amendment of the Schengen Border Code and Convention implementing the 
Schengen  Agreement;  Judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters:  combating  attacks  against  information  systems; 
European Investigation Order; Budget 2013 aspects relating to Internal Security; and EU Passenger Name Records. 
44 European Parliament Press Release, ‘Schengen: MEPs strongly object to Council decision and consider legal action’ 
12-06-2012. 
45 According to several interviews with policymakers of the European Parliament. 
46  See  Council  of  the EU  (2013)  Draft  consolidated  compromise  text  -  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  on the 
establishment  of  an  evaluation  mechanism  to  verify  the  application  of  the  Schengen  acquis,  Council  Document 
10273/13, Brussels, 30 May 2013. 
47 Council Decision of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea 
external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of 
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the  Schengen  Borders  Code.
48  As  with  the  Schengen  Governance  Package,  the  choice  of  legislative 
procedure (in this instance the use of a ‘Decision’ by the Council) effectively meant excluding the EP from 
the decision-making process. The CJEU upheld the Parliament’s complaint, concluding that the contested 
rules  were  not  minor,  non-essential  provisions  as  the  Council  and  Commission  maintained,  but  that 
“adoption of such rules constitutes a major development in the SBC system” and therefore required the 
approval of the European Parliament.
49 What do these controversies tell us about the ways in which each of 
the EU institutional actors have accommodated themselves to a more plural and democratic institutional 
setting in AFSJ decision-making?  
3.1.2  The EP struggles for legitimacy and authority in a post-Lisbon context 
The outcomes of these policy disputes need to be viewed in the context of the EP’s struggles for legitimacy 
and authority as LIBE establishes its identity as AFSJ co-owner and legislator. 
First, these cases reveal a set of struggles over authority and competence emerging since 2009 that indicate 
that  the  Council  and  the  European  Commission  may  still  have  not  fully  internalised  the  full  reach  and 
implications of the EP’s new position as a powerful co-legislating actor in the post-Lisbon EU institutional 
landscape. Judging by the underlying dynamics of the controversies discussed above, the formal recognition 
of the EP’s powers post-Lisbon have not been accompanied by a full transition in ‘mindset’ among the 
Commission, Council and member states. Indeed, the Schengen Freeze and the drawn out negotiations over 
the Schengen Governance Package were triggered by the resistance of member states to accept the Union-
centred approach underpinning the Package (by pushing to maintain the features of an inter-governmental 
evaluation  mechanism  and  retain  decisional  power  over  the  reintroduction  of  internal  borders)  which 
revealed a strong preference to retain national sovereignty or even ‘re-nationalise’ elements of the Schengen 
acquis.
50  
In certain scenarios, the Council and Commission have resorted to alternative and inappropriate legislative 
procedures in order to circumvent the application of democratic oversight to AFSJ policy-making imposed 
by Lisbon. The choice  of  legal basis  or the  decision to use technical  (non-accountable) procedures  like 
delegated acts, while often justified by the use of highly technical arguments, in reality often masks deep 
political issues and institutional struggles and brings important implications for the degree of influence 
accorded to the EP in the decision-making process. 
However, the EP’s response – demonstrated most notably in the Schengen Freeze – reveals a new self-
assurance by the EP in ‘flexing its muscles’ and making use of the mechanisms at its disposal to exert 
its  legislative  authority.  Similarly,  controversies  sparked  over  the  first  voting  down  of  the  EU-US 
SWIFT/TFTP  agreement,  or  the  annulment  action  over  the  guidelines  in  the  SBC  for  rescue  at  sea, 
constitute visible examples of the Parliament seeking recognition of its authority before the Council. 
These cases indicate that LIBE’s long-standing (pre-Lisbon) ‘strategic activism’ in asserting its role and 
having its powers recognised and properly implemented by its institutional partners has continued during 
the post-Lisbon Treaty phase. The EP has shown itself ready to  draw on the range  of  weapons  in  its 
armoury to assert its authority, whether that be litigation before the Court,
51 suspending cooperation on a 
                                                   
48 Comitology is a process by which EU law is modified or adjusted not by legislative acts but within "comitology 
committees" chaired by the European Commission. Comitology procedures are reserved for what has been labelled as 
‘non-essential’ elements or the technical details of the implementation of legislative acts. In fact, these elements are too 
often highly political in nature. 
49 Case C-355/10, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) of 5 September 2012 
50 S. Carrera, N. Hernanz and J. Parkin (2013), “Local and Regional Authorities and the EU’s External Borders: A 
Multi-Level Governance Assessment of Schengen Governance and ‘Smart Borders’’, Study for the Committee of the 
Regions, Brussels.  
51 Refer to the list of European Parliament’s use of litigation before the CJEU in Annex 2. 16  CARRERA, HERNANZ & PARKIN  
 
swathe of legislative files or exercising its powers over international agreements, and it has done so with a 
degree of success.  
However, the EP’s struggles for authority have been complicated by its concurrent effort to be considered in 
its  new  role  as  ‘legitimate  co-legislator’  in  its  relations  with  the  Commission  and  Council.  The  inter-
institutional pressures to be a ‘responsible partner’ and the progressive adaptation of the EP as ‘trusted’ co-
institutional owner of the EU’s AFSJ has been accompanied by a growing dilemma inside LIBE as to the 
way in which its powers are to be used and exercised in its relations with the Council and the Commission. 
The dilemma can be encapsulated, in essence, by a phrase raised by one of our interviewees when asked 
about the new co-legislator role of the EP: “the power to say ‘no’ changes when you have the power”. 
The  search  for  legitimacy  may  therefore  explain  the  willingness  of  the  EP  to  pass  controversial 
international  agreements  and  legislation  in  the  post-Lisbon  era  which,  in  certain  cases,  might 
represent a break or inconsistency with its own past policy positions. For instance, the Parliament’s 
consent to the EU-US PNR agreement not only diverged from its previous stance on the same issue but, as 
highlighted by the literature, indicated an overall inconsistency with LIBE’s previously strong defence of 
data protection within the EU.
52 Pre-Lisbon, the LIBE Committee had resisted a policy paradigm – promoted 
by (among others) the Commission
53 – that relied on the so-called ‘balance metaphor’ which called for 
striking a right ‘balance’ between  liberty and security, an approach which  has proved to be particularly 
problematic when applied to data protection and privacy. However, the post-Lisbon EP has, in negotiating 
international data processing agreements, appeared to limit itself to “damage control” (to quote one senior 
member of the LIBE Committee)
54 rather than risk characterisation as a disruptive and unreliable member of 
the ‘institutional triangle’. This poses LIBE with a relatively new predicament when it comes to finding its 
post-Lisbon identity as both watchdog of fundamental rights and democratic scrutiny and co-owner of EU 
security policy. A similar dilemma can be observed when looking at the EP’s experience in the application of 
the ordinary legislative procedure to AFSJ cooperation, which we now analyse. 
3.2  The European Parliament and the ordinary legislative procedure in the EU’s AFSJ 
This section deals with the main developments experienced by the EP in its performance and application of 
the ordinary legislative procedure in AFSJ policy domains. The LIBE Committee is now consecrated as one 
of the most dynamic committees inside the Parliament. It ranks amongst those EP Committees dealing with 
the largest number of legislative dossiers and files. As Figure 1 below shows, during the 7
th Parliamentary 
Term  (2009  –  2014)  LIBE  has  been  responsible  for  12%  of  legislative  reports  tabled  by  all  the  EP 
committees, making LIBE the second most ‘active’ committee as regards legislative activity (only behind the 
INTA Committee). Figure 2 reveals a slightly more nuanced picture when looking at the total number of files 
(legislative and non-legislative) handled by committee, with LIBE in 6
th position. When paying attention to 
LIBE’s handling of ordinary legislative procedure files, it can be highlighted that it has dealt with 9% of 
those files during this term (2009-2014), compared 7% during the previous term (2004-2009).
55 This reflects 
the increasing importance of EU AFSJ legislation in a post-Lisbon Treaty context. As our analysis below 
demonstrates, LIBE’s incursion in the ordinary legislative procedure has also led to the emergence of a set of 
                                                   
52 D. Bigo et al (2011), “Towards a New EU Legal Framework for Data Protection and Privacy: Challenges, Principles 
and  the  Role  of  the  European  Parliament”,  study  for  the  European  Parliament’s  Directorate  General  for  Internal 
Policies, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (DG IPOL), November 2011. 
53  See,  for  instance,  the  Speech  by  Commissioner  Franco  Frattini  “Data  protection  and  transfer  of  PNR  data”, 
Strasbourg, 13 December 2006, where Commissioner Frattini states that: “there is an important balance to be struck 
between measures to ensure security on the one hand and the protection of non-negotiable fundamental rights on the 
other.” 
54  See  N.  Hernanz  (2012),  “More  Surveillance,  More  Security?  The  Landscape  of  Surveillance  in  Europe  and 
Challenges  to  Data  Protection  and  Privacy”,  Policy  Report  on  the  Proceedings  of  a  Conference  at  the  European 
Parliament, SAPIENT Deliverable 6.4, January. 
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informal and flexible decision making processes/practices (Section 3.2.1), which raise in turn a number of 
accountability and transparency challenges (Section 3.2.2). 
Figure 1. Distribution of legislative reports (COD, CNS and APP) by parliamentary committee,  
2009–2013  
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
Figure 2. Distribution of legislative and non-legislative reports by parliamentary committee, 2009–2013. 
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3.2.1  Informal Legislative Procedures and Methods  
Since  its  establishment  by  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  1992,  the  ‘co-decision  procedure’  (renamed  the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ by the Lisbon Treaty and now foreseen in Article 289 TFEU) has been one 
of the key components of European integration. Still, beyond the general knowledge on the joint adoption by 
the Council and the EP of a legislative proposal presented by the Commission, its detailed specifics remain 
largely unknown or misunderstood. This is particularly due to the ways in which it operates in practice. 
While the letter of the Treaties might be clear to a certain degree as regards its procedural steps, the inter-
institutional methods that have been developed when applying it have fundamentally mutated this procedure 
in rather unexpected ways that disrupt its technical and procedural components. 
One first revelation emerging from the incursion of the EP’s role in the ordinary legislative procedure into 
AFSJ-related  matters  has  been  the  increasing  use  of  informal  ways  and  paths  of  behaviour  both 
internally as well as when engaging with the other institutional actors. Ordinary legislative procedure 
files are being concluded in very preliminary or early stages of the negotiation process – at first reading 
or  early in the second agreement.
56 The priority has  been to reach agreements and ‘results’ as soon as 
possible in the procedures with the rotating Presidency and Council.  
This tendency was not unknown in other fields of activity in Parliament. Also, as regards the AFSJ, it had 
already started back in 2005 for files falling within the remits of the old First Pillar. According to the EP’s 
activity  report  for  2004-2009,  a  big  majority  (84.2%)  of  agreements  reached  under  the  ordinary 
legislative procedure in domains transferred by the 2005 Council Decision to the Community method of 
cooperation  (irregular  immigration,  borders,  visas,  asylum,  etc.)
57  was  reached  in  the  first  reading 
agreement. The expansion of this practice to the wider AFSJ, however, raises a number of concerns 
due  to  the  sensitive  implications  for  fundamental  rights  inherent  in  its  nature  and  effects.  This  is 
particularly so for security-related policies (police and criminal justice cooperation), as these are areas where 
the need to ensure a higher degree of scrutiny and transparency is perhaps more crucial in light of their 
impact over the rights and liberties of individuals. 
Since 2009, the ‘first reading agreements’ system has been confirmed and reinvigorated; the proportion of 
dossiers concluded in first reading has grown exponentially. Figure 3 below illustrates the total percentage of 
ordinary legislative procedure, consultation and consent reports tabled by the LIBE Committee, as well as 
the proportion of COD files that were adopted in first, second and third reading (see also Annex 1 of this 
Briefing Paper for a full statistical coverage of LIBE Committee activities during the reporting period). It is 
striking to see that 82% of the ordinary legislative procedure files handled by the LIBE Committee have been 
adopted in first reading between 2009 and the first half of 2013. Only 18% have passed to second reading, 
and none to third reading. 
                                                   
56 See De Capitani, E. (2011), op. cit. 
57 See European Parliament (2009) Activity Report 1 May 2004 to 13 July 2009, PE427.162v01-00, Brussels, p. 11  
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Figure 3. Distribution of LIBE legislative reports by type of procedure, 2009-2013 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
What  might the  main factors  have been that played a role  in the increasing use  of ‘first readings’ and 
‘fast/informal’ tracking decision-making by the EP? According to the EP’s Conciliation and Co-Decision 
Activity Report (2004-2006)
58, it was deemed to be mainly related to “the greater familiarity” with the co-
decision  procedure  of  the  Parliament,  Council  and  Commission.  The  Co-Decision  Activity  Report 
highlighted that:  
Negotiations between the Institutions begin at an earlier stage in the procedure, and they often make 
faster progress, than was the case in the past. Greater trust and more flexibility in working together 
have enabled the Institutions to reach more quickly mutually satisfactory agreements on a growing 
number of legislative dossiers.
59  
In a similar attempt to explain the reasons behind the disproportionate use of first reading agreements, the EP 
Activity  Report  for  the  period  2009-2011  also  alluded  to  the  increasing  familiarity  with  the  legislative 
procedure and the possibility to conclude negotiations with the EP following a simple majority vote. The 
following factors were added: 
Sometimes, it is also feared that files with controversial issues may be blocked in the Council. Also, 
there are more and better contacts between the institutions whose representatives start talking to each 
other  earlier  in  the  procedure.  Furthermore,  there  is  the  agenda-setting  at  the  highest  level  for 
politically  sensitive  files.  Finally,  the  Council  Presidencies  seem  eager  to  reach  early  agreements 
during their Presidencies and seem to favour first reading negotiations, for which the arrangements are 
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more flexible than in later stages of the procedure (in the first reading there are no time-limits). The 
Parliament tends to try and use this eagerness and the internal debating in the Council to get better 
results in the negotiations. In addition, the Commission often pushes for an early adoption because it 
will be able to demonstrate efficiency and hopes that its proposal will be adopted with as few changes 
as possible.
60  
At this point, we need to bring to the attention of the reader that first reading agreements only require a 
simple  majority  by  the  EP,  and  a  qualified  majority  voting  in  the  Council,  which  constitutes  another 
determining factor for their practical success.
61 It therefore appears that the adaptation of behaviour patterns 
by the LIBE Committee to its new co-legislator role towards informal and early agreements with Council can 
be attributed to a number of factors related to greater flexibility and faster progress in decision-making, 
in contrast with more ‘formalised’ and ‘time-consuming’ procedures envisaged by the Treaties. What 
remains unclear, however, is the extent to which the development of these informalities does actually show 
an  increase  in  ‘mutual  trust’  between  the  relevant  inter-institutional  actors,  particularly  between  the 
Parliament and the Council. As shown above in Section 3.1, mistrust and competition in the AFSJ’s inter-
institutional landscape appears to continue being the rule in a post-Lisbon Treaty context. The extent to 
which  these  informal  methods  facilitate  trust-building  relations  between  the  institutional  actors 
involved is unclear, as further developed and demonstrated in Section 3.2.2 below. 
Informal relations have also been developed between the EP and member states in the phases preceding or 
coinciding  with  the  conduct  of  AFSJ  legislative  dossiers.  Our  interviews  have  revealed  an  increasing 
influence of national governments and member states permanent representations in Brussels on the 
relevant EP rapporteurs from the very early stages of ordinary legislative procedure negotiations. This 
development  had  already  been  identified  by  Farrell  and  Héritier  (2003)  in  respect  to  the  wider  EP’s 
legislative competences in other EU policy domains:  
As the Parliament’s influence over the legislative process has increased, individual member states have 
begun to realise that they may sometimes achieve outcomes which would otherwise have been difficult 
or impossible, through influencing MEPs… in a very important issue (MEPs) would mostly be advised 
by the governments what way they wish it to go…and they very often comply.
62 
The role  of co-legislator for the LIBE Committee  has meant that MEPs are addressed  on an  increasing 
number  of  interests,  including  domestic  agendas,  by  their  respective  national  governments,  third-party 
countries like the USA or private sector representatives (such as airline and IT companies). The role of 
Permanent  Representations  in  Brussels  appears  to  have  been  increasingly  decisive  when  looking  at  the 
changing  dynamics  of  the  inter-institutional  relations  between  the  Parliament  and  the  Council,  and  the 
identified  culture  of  early  informal  agreements  in  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure.  This  seems  to  be 
particularly the  case in respect of large  member states,  member state governments  with similar political 
affiliations to the EP rapporteurs, or in the case those member states hold the Presidency of the EU.
63  
A key question that remains open is ‘who’ wins with first reading or early informal agreements? Or, in other 
words,  into  ‘whose  interest’  do  these  practices  play?  The  priority  given  to  reaching  an  early  and  fast 
                                                   
60  European  Parliament  (2012),  Activity  Report  (14  July  2009  –  31  December  2011),  7th  Parliamentary  Term, 
DV\903361EN, p. 5 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/activity_reports/activity_report_2009_2011_en.pdf)  
61 In addition, as De Clerck-Sachsse and Kaczynski (2009) highlighted the informality also strengthens the role of 
Committees over Plenary in the decision making process for two main reasons: first, the composition of a specific 
Committee does not always match with that of Plenary; second, a pre-negotiated compromise by the Committee limits 
the room for action and debate by Plenary. 
62 Page 28. 
63 It could be argued that this tendency may raise tensions in respect of MEPs’ independence as outlined in Decision 
2005/684 of 28 September 2005 adopting the Statute for Members of the European Parliament OJ L262/1; Decision of 
the Bureau of 11 and 23 November 2009, 14 December 2009, 14 December 2009, 19 April 2010 and 5 July 2010 
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compromise  rather  than  allowing  for  ‘controversy’  and  democratic  debate  (and  potential  rejection  of 
proposals) could be said to follow, and therefore favour, the Council’s  working  methods and  hence the 
interests of member state governments, which also have increasingly early ‘inputs’ into the Parliament’s 
AFSJ  legislative  work.  As  highlighted  above,  the  rotating  Presidencies  might  also  ‘win’  as  some  are 
particularly eager and efficient in accelerating the conclusion of agreements on legislative dossiers during 
their six-month mandate. The Commission can be also said to benefit from these informal practices, as they 
often facilitate the adoption of a majority of its legislative proposals. It is therefore not clear the extent to 
which early and informal agreements benefit the Parliament’s own scrutiny tasks which, as we assess in 
more detail in the next section, face important accountability and transparency challenges. 
3.2.2  Accountability and transparency  
Concerns have been raised over the lack of transparency and scrutiny of these informal agreements and 
decisions, as well as lack of clarity and coordination of the procedures to be applied.
64 The presence of 
transparency-related deficits in the conduct of legislative files by the EP has been signalled by civil society 
actors and the scholarly literature, which has regarded the ordinary legislative procedure as suffering from 
accountability gaps because it is increasingly subject to ad hoc and early negotiations between Parliament 
and Council staff that are not subject to clear rules. This has meant a consequent loss of transparency and of 
opportunity  for  democratic  inputs.
65  The  use  of  the  so-called  informal  ‘trialogues’  (also  known  as 
‘trilogues’) or tripartite meetings between the EP, Council and Commission in the phases preceding the 
first reading agreement represent another issue of concern. Decisions concerning highly technical, yet also 
highly political elements are often reached before using the formal decision-making procedural models and 
channels within the EP, as well as those applying to EP-Council relations.  
Bunyan (2007)
66 and Farrell and Héritier (2003)
67 have raised concerns over informal trilogues and argued 
that  the  recognition  of  more  powers  for  the  EP  has  had  unexpected  side-effects  over  transparency, 
accountability  and  democratic  legitimation.  In  the  words  of  Farrell  and  Héritier,  “it  is  often  extremely 
difficult for others within the Parliament, let alone outsiders, to have any idea of what exactly is going on in 
a  specific  brief”.  This,  in  their  opinion,  may  lead  to  “the  short-circuiting  of  democratic  processes  of 
deliberation in committee and in plenary” and undermine the standards of democratic accountability that 
Parliament is supposed to live up to. Peers (2008) has raised similar concerns about the unsatisfactory level 
of openness and transparency regarding ‘first reading’ (former co-decision) deals. In his view,  
It is practically impossible for outsiders…to work out whether first-reading negotiations are underway, 
what stage  negotiations are at, and what drafts are under discussion. Once an agreement has been 
reached  between  the  EP  and  the  Council,  there  is  often  little  time  for  civil  society  or  national 
parliaments to react before the adoption of the text.
68 
                                                   
64 For a theoretical discussion concerning the tensions between ‘effectiveness’ and ‘democratic accountability’, and the 
elusiveness of the concept of democratic accountability in EU decision making process, refer to N. Walker (2004), “In 
Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey”, in N. Walker (ed), Europe’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, Oxford University Press, pp. 3-37. 
65 S. Peers (2011), EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford EU Law Library, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 
page 121; P. Craig (2013), The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, Oxford University Press, page 346. 
66 T. Bunyan, Statewatch Viewpoint: Secret Trialogues and the Democratic Deficit, September 2007. 
67  H.  Farrell  and  A.  Héritier  (2003),  “The  Invisible  Transformation  of  Codecision:  Problems  of  Democratic 
Legitimacy”, SIPES (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies), Report No. 7, June, p. 8. 
68 S. Peers (2008), Proposals for greater openness, transparency and democracy in the EU, Statewatch Analysis, October 
2008, (www.statewatch.org). The formal trialogues are expected to be used following the second reading of a legislative 
proposal. For a discussion on the differences between trialogues and conciliation committee, as well as the extent to 
which  they  represent  a  competing  decision-making  arrangement,  refer  to  A.E.  Stie  (2013),  Democratic  Decision-
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‘Rapidity’ and a low level of formality in reaching compromises and decisions with the Presidency and the 
Council seem therefore to be the determining factors behind this widespread practice. An obvious result of 
informal trilogues and early agreements leading to first reading adoption of a legislative file is its swift 
adoption ‘without further delay’, which has been traditionally framed by the Council and the Commission as 
an ‘efficient  way  of  working’. Indeed, the average speed  of the  negotiations procedures of some  of the 
ordinary legislative procedure files has also increased in the first reading, from an average of 16.2 months 
during 2004-2009, to 14.4 months between 2009 and 2011.
69  
It needs to be acknowledged, however, that the ‘rules of the game’ covering these informal processes 
have been a matter of attention and reframing since 2007 inside the EP, and some positive developments 
have taken place since then. The Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the Co-decision Procedure 
by  European  Parliament,  Council  and  Commission  of  9  March  2007
70  expressly  recognised  that  the 
cooperation  between  ‘the  institutions’  often  takes  place  in  the  shape  of  tripartite  meetings  or  informal 
trilogues.  It  concluded  that  this  system  had  demonstrated  its  “vitality  and  flexibility”  in  increasing  the 
possibility for agreement at first reading stages. The Joint Declaration left it to each institution to further 
define,  in  light  of  its  Rules  of  Procedure,  the  participants  in  each  meeting  and  the  mandate  for  the 
negotiations, and to inform in good time the other institutions of the meeting arrangements. It also stated that 
“in order to enhance transparency, trilogues taking place within the European Parliament and Council shall 
be announced, where practicable”.  
The challenges pertaining to informal and non-transparent procedures in the EP legislative activities were 
also  addressed  in  a  Report  on  Legislative  Activities  and  Inter-institutional  relations  issued  by  the  EP 
Working Party on Parliamentary Reform of 2008
71 under the chairmanship of Roth-Behrendt. The Report 
concluded that the trend on ‘early agreements’: 
…demonstrates the flexibility of the procedure itself and, more importantly, a greater degree of trust 
and willingness to cooperate on the part of the Institutions. First and early second reading conclusions 
build on the practice of good cooperation obtained by the Institutions over the years and have the 
advantage of requiring only simple majority for their approval in the plenary. They speak therefore for 
speed, convenience and certain predictability as regards the vote in the plenary.
72  
The Report restated the previous formal early agreements as well as the quality of the legislation. It insisted 
that these ‘fast-track decision-making methods’ limited the scope of ‘political debate’ and highlighted that:  
When  Parliament  is  asked  to  confirm  in  plenary  a  pre-negotiated  agreement  reached  at  informal 
meetings between a small number  of representatives of the three Institutions (on Parliament's side 
normally the rapporteur, sometimes the committee chair and one or more shadow rapporteurs) this 
certainly does not increase Parliament's visibility in the public and the media, who are looking for 
political confrontation along clear political lines and not for a flat, 'technocratic' debate where the 
representatives of the three Institutions congratulate each other on the "good work" done.
73 (Emphasis 
added). 
This last sentence is particularly relevant in illustrating how the adaptation of the EP to the Council’s and 
Commission’s  technocratic  ways  of  working  in  legislative  procedures  has  perhaps  contaminated  the  EP 
resulting  in  certain  paths  of  behaviour,  which  limit  controversy  and  political  accountability  inside  and 
outside the Parliament’s building. There seems to be another fundamental tension stemming from this, when 
                                                   
69 European Parliament (2012), Activity Report 2009 –2011), op. cit., page 6. 
70 Council of the EU, Joint Declaration on practical arrangements for the co-decision procedure - Final revised version 
of the Joint Declaration, 7061/07, 9 March 2007. 
71  European  Parliament,  Report  on  Legislative  Activities  and  Inter-institutional  Relations,  Working  Party  on 
Parliamentary  Reform,  PE  406.309/CPG/GT, 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/eplive/expert/multimedia/20090326MLT52708/media_20090326MLT52708.pdf) 
72 Ibid., page 26.  
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certain  issues  under  negotiation  in  a  particular  file  are  artificially  qualified  as  ‘technical’  (instead  of 
‘political’). Depending on the labelling, it may or may not open up democratic accountability and debate 
inside the EP itself. This is also problematic as issues considered to be ‘technical’ might in fact prove to be 
highly political during negotiations.
74 A similar concern was also raised by a previous CEPS study (De 
Clerck-Sachsse and Kaczynski, 2009), which stated that  
The increasing bureaucratization of the EP seen under the last legislature might be seen necessary to 
allow  the  EP  to  operate  efficiently  and  react  swiftly  to  important  policy  events.  But…these 
developments could undermine the EP’s role as a public forum and a centre for debate [which] could 
be detrimental to the Parliament and to European integration in the long run.
75 
The  above-mentioned  EP  Working  Party  on  Parliamentary  Reform  proposed  a  number  of  specific  and 
positive  reforms  to  address  these  challenges,  which  included  the  need  to  limit  early  the  number  of 
agreements taking account of the distinctive characteristics of every individual file and should be politically 
justified (e.g. in terms of political priorities, the uncontroversial or 'technical' nature of the proposal, an 
urgency situation, etc.). It also recommended that the decision should be subject to a prior political debate in 
the relevant committee and should be taken either by broad consensus or by a vote, if necessary. A decision 
should be also taken to determine the composition of the negotiating team (rapporteur, committee chair, 
shadow rapporteurs) and a clear mandate for negotiations with the Council. Furthermore, after each trilogue 
the negotiating team should report to the Committee on the outcome of negotiations. 
The 2012 Guerrero Report carried out by the EP Committee on Constitutional Affairs
76 followed up some 
of  the  elements  identified  in  the  2008  EP  Working  Party  on  Parliamentary  Reform  by  amending  the 
Parliament’s Rules  of Procedure. The Guerrero Report sets the  need  for EP negotiations  with the  other 
institutions in the course of legislative procedure to be conducted with regard to ‘the Code of Conduct’ laid 
down by the Conference of Presidents.
77 According to Rule 70.2.a, the negotiating team shall be led by the 
rapporteur and presided over by the Chair of the Committee responsible or by a Vice-Chair designated by the 
Chair. It shall also comprise at least the shadow rapporteurs from each political group. Also, according to the 
new Rule 70.2.b, the negotiating team shall report back to the Committee responsible and make available the 
documents reflecting ‘the outcome’ of the last trilogue. When there is no time for this, the negotiating team 
shall  report  back  to  the  Chair,  the  shadow  rapporteurs  and  the  coordinators  of  the  Committee.  The 
Committee “may update the mandate in light of the progress of the negotiations”. 
As the EP Activity Report 2009-2011 underlined, each EP committee has developed its own ‘cultures’ and 
‘practices’ regarding the stage of conclusion and conduct of inter-institutional negotiations.
78 LIBE has not 
been  an  exception.  According  to  Ripoll  Servent  (2011),
79  the  consequences  of  the  developments  and 
transparency concerns surrounding the informalities and early agreements in co-decision files led the LIBE 
Committee to establish an orientation vote at the beginning of negotiations with the Council, which was 
                                                   
74 Other innovative methods of inter-institutional cooperation have been also developed informally. An interesting 
experiment to improve inter-institutional negotiations between Parliament, Council and the Commission took place in 
respect of the negotiations of the so-called ‘Asylum Package’. It was launched under the Polish Presidency of the EU 
(July-December 2011) and consisted in the setting up of an informal Contact Group at the EP between the various 
rapporteurs of the legislative files and the organization of meetings in order to coordinate a general approach. It counted 
with the participation of the Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and the relevant Presidency. 
75 J. De Clerck-Sachsse and P. Maciej Kaczynski (2009), “The European Parliament – More powerful, less legitimate? 
An outlook for the 7
th term”, CEPS Working Document No. 314, May, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
76 European Parliament, Report on amendment of Rule 70 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on interinstitutional 
negotiations in legislative procedures, 20.9.2012, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rapporteur: Enrique Guerrero 
Salom, A7-0281/2012. 
77 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/meps/201305_Code_of_conduct_EN.pdf  
78 European Parliament (2012), Activity Report 2009-2011, op. cit., page 4. 
79 A. Ripoll Servent (2011), “Playing the Codecision Game? Rules’ Changes and Institutional Adaptation at the LIBE 
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primarily  intended  to  give  an  idea  to  rapporteurs  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  negotiations,  what  might  be 
acceptable and the main concerns of LIBE. However, the attractiveness of the use of the orientation vote in 
LIBE has changed since the beginning of 2013 with the Guerrero Report. The possibility for any political 
group to challenge ‘the orientation vote’ before the Conference of Presidents to be confirmed in Plenary 
renders it no longer such an attractive option.
80 Therefore, while the orientation vote is still possible,
81 it 
appears that since January 2013, its practice has diminished. According to the  new Rule 70.2, a simple 
majority vote is now required in parliamentary committees to adopt a decision starting the inter-institutional 
negotiations on a Commission proposal. That decision shall determine the mandate and the composition of 
the negotiating team. 
While  rules  appear  to  have  become  clearer,  transparency  and  accountability  deficits  still  remain  in 
practice. The actual implementation, and positive effects, of these sets of guidelines and codes of conduct 
are difficult to measure. Interviews carried out for the purposes of this Briefing Paper have, for instance, 
revealed that there is a lack of transparency as regards the four/multi-column working document which 
reflects the positions of each of the inter-institutional negotiations during the ordinary legislative procedures, 
including those of the Council and the European Parliament, with regards to each individual amendment, as 
well as any compromise texts distributed at the meeting(s).  
Another  unresolved  question  relates  to  ‘who’  owns  and  controls  that  strategic  four-column  working 
document  during  inter-institutional  negotiations.  The  lack  of  inclusion  of  the  Council’s  position  in  the 
document has been also pointed out as a common practice causing concern for our interviewees. The non-
publication  allows  the  Council  to  change  and  modulate  its  ‘general  approach’  during  the  conduct  of 
negotiations with the Parliament and to sometimes take a different position. There is no information being 
provided as regards the different positions of member states during negotiations. In addition, the majority of 
the key documents remains confidential in nature. As regard the EP’s position here, in a majority of the cases 
the  level  of  transparency  still  depends  largely  on  the  willingness  and  working  methods  of  each  EP 
rapporteur.  The  main  decisions  and  evolving  positions  of  the  actors  involved  are  still  commonly 
developed behind closed doors with secretive procedures and methods characterised by opacity, while 
dressed up with a number of bureaucratic features, guidelines and technical procedures. Moreover, the 
orientation votes adopted by the LIBE Committee and other relevant negotiation documents are extremely 
difficult to find on the EP LIBE’s website and are often not publicly available.
82 
It can therefore be concluded that the Council and the Commission’s readings of ‘efficiency’ might be 
deceiving from a democratic scrutiny viewpoint. The EP has been somehow caught up in these pre-
existing working methods and bureaucratic procedures of the Council and Commission as negotiators. 
It is therefore not clear the extent to which this plays in its favour when seeking legitimacy, in particular 
‘speed’ and early agreements might well contravene not only the very democratic principles that the 
EP purports to hold, but also the quality and consistency of the legislation adopted. Further, lobbying by 
member state governments to have early inputs into Parliament legislative outputs might well undermine 
                                                   
80 Rule 70.a paragraph 1 which says that “Any decision by a committee on the opening of negotiations prior to the 
adoption of a report in committee shall be translated into all the official languages, distributed to all Members of 
Parliament and submitted to the Conference of Presidents. At the request of a political group, the Conference of 
Presidents may decide to include the time, for consideration with a debate and vote, in the draft agenda of the part-
session following the distribution, in which case the President shall set a deadline for the tabling of amendments”. See 
also Rule 70.a.2 which says “the item shall be included in the agenda of the part-session following the announcement 
for consideration with a debate and vote, and the President shall set a deadline for the tabling of amendments where 
one-tenth of the component Members of Parliament coming from at least two political groups or at least two political 
groups so request within 48 hours after the announcement”. 
81 It is still possible “By way of exception, where the committee responsible considers it duly justified to enter into 
negotiations prior to the adoption of a report in committee, the mandate may consist of a set of amendments or a set of 
clearly defined objectives, priorities and orientations”. 
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the independence and agency of the EP in delivering its duty of oversight and scrutiny effectively and its 
Treaty-based duty to represent the interests of the citizens, rather than those of the member states.  
3.3  The European Parliament as a ‘policy setter and maker’ in the EU AFSJ 
A second development which in the performance of the EP and its LIBE Committee from the end of 2009 
until now has been its evolving role and contributions as ‘policy shaper and setter’ in EU AFSJ policies, 
including those related to old EU Third Pillar security-related policy domains, i.e. cooperation in policing 
and criminal justice. This section outlines the various ways in which the EP has developed its growing policy 
role in AFSJ programming and agenda-making in the shape of non-legislative instruments like own-initiative 
reports and resolutions (Section 3.3.1), and the shortcomings from which they suffer, which often relate to a 
lack of ‘follow up’ by the European Commission and a number of inconsistencies in the EP’s own internal 
work (Section 3.3.2). 
3.3.1  AFSJ strategic policy programming  
European cooperation on the AFSJ has been characterised since the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty (and its transfer 
to shared competence of a number of JHA policies) by the adoption of five-year programmes providing 
the policy agenda and legislative planning of the AFSJ by the European Council. This process first started 
with the Tampere Programme (1999),
83 followed by the Hague Programme (2004)
84 and its final version 
under  the  guise  of  the  Stockholm  Programme  (2009).
85  The  exclusivity  over  the  ownership  of  AFSJ 
multiannual programming held by the Council reflected the predominance of ‘intergovernmentalism’ and 
member states’ exclusive competences in EU police and criminal justice cooperation. It was also a 
clear  manifestation  of  the  lack  of  a  proper  European  institutional  pluralism  giving  form  to  AFSJ 
policies, with the EP largely excluded from playing an authoritative role. 
The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations since the beginning of 2010 changed the previously 
Council-dominated context, by consolidating the competences of the European Commission and formally 
recognising the Parliament as an equal co-legislator in these domains. The first steps taken in putting the 
Lisbon Treaty ‘into practice’ for AFSJ policies experienced turf disputes between the Council and the 
Commission  over  the  ownership  of  strategic  policy  and  legislative  programming  in  the  AFSJ.  These 
struggles materialised in what has become known as the Stockholm Affair.
86 
After the publication by the Council of the Stockholm Programme in December 2009, the newly established 
Barroso Commission adopted a Communication (Action Plan) implementing the Stockholm Programme in 
April 2010.
87 The Action Plan was regarded by the Council as a clear act of provocation because it was 
deemed to go beyond the framework of policy priorities envisaged by the Council’s Stockholm Programme. 
As has been argued elsewhere (Carrera and Guild, 2012),
88 the affair revealed the new post-Lisbon Treaty 
                                                   
83 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, SN 200/99, 
Brussels.  
84 Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 4 and 5 November 2004, 14292/1/04, Brussels, 8 December 
2004, Annex I, “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union”, point 
1.5 (2005/C53/01, OJ C53/1, 3.3.2005). 
85 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme: An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens, 5731/10, Brussels, 3 March 2010. 
86 Carrera, S. (2012), “The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon over EU Policies on Migration, Asylum and Borders: The 
Struggles over the Ownership of the Stockholm Programme”, in E. Guild, P. Minderhoud and R. Cholewinski (eds), 
The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 229-254. 
87 European Commission, Communication, Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens: 
Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final, Brussels, 20.4.2010. 
88 S. Carrera and E. Guild (2012), “Does the Stockholm Programme Matter? The Struggles over the Ownership of AFSJ 
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institutional dynamics affecting European integration of the AFSJ, where Commission and Parliament 
are equal institutional partners in JHA decision-making. ’Lisbon’ has meant a new and more pluralistic 
institutional setting in AFSJ landscape which has affected the classical relational power and actor-based 
institutional design in AFSJ cooperation in the EU, where the member states’ and the Council’s wishes are 
no longer the only guiding motors. The resulting scenario since the end of 2009 is one characterised by an 
increasingly multi-strategy policy programming setting, where diverse and competing (and sometimes 
even incoherent) AFSJ policy agendas emerge and develop from the Commission as well as the EP. 
The EP, and its LIBE Committee, has become a co-owner of the AFSJ policy agenda. While it does not 
have a right to initiate legislation recognised by the Treaties, LIBE has been increasingly involved in AFSJ 
policy priority-setting since the end of 2009. This has taken place mainly through the adoption of own-
initiative reports and resolutions on important AFSJ-related subjects.
89 A number of high quality and 
forward-looking own-initiative reports have been adopted since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
where the EP has put forward its own policy initiatives and strategies on JHA. Here, the EP has gradually 
acquired a role as a policy agenda-setter, no longer only depending on the Council’s or Commission’s 
initiatives and agendas as in the pre-Lisbon Treaty landscape. This had been already anticipated in its 2009 
Resolution on the Stockholm Programme,
90 where the Parliament underlined that it reserved “the right to 
come back with specific proposals when it is consulted on the legislative action programme”. 
All these instruments contain forward-looking policy priorities and initiatives ‘of its own’, which do not 
necessarily match those outlined in the Council’s 2009 Stockholm Programme and the Commission’s Action 
Plan implementing it. This has, for instance, included putting forward its own proposals in AFSJ policy areas 
of special political salience such as the 
Internal  Security  Strategy  (ISS),  the 
EU’s counter-terrorism policies or the 
alleged  transportation  and  illegal 
detention  of  prisoners  in  European 
countries by the CIA.
91 The EP 2012 
Resolution  on  the  situation  of 
fundamental  rights  in  the  EU 
constitutes a case in point here. The EP 
launched  the  idea  for  a  ‘European 
fundamental  rights  policy  cycle’, 
calling on the Commission to carry out 
a  swift  revision  of  the  EU  acquis  on 
police  and  criminal  matters  in 
compliance with the Lisbon Treaty and 
the  EU  Charter  and  to  propose  a 
detailed  initiative  for  a  clear-cut 
monitoring  mechanism  and  early 
warning system, as well as a freezing 
                                                   
89 These, and the procedure for their adoption, are stipulated in Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the EP. Moreover, 
the EP can also adopt motions of resolution provided in Rule 47 of Rules of Procedure. 
90 European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2009 on the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council – An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen – Stockholm programme, 
P7_TA(2009)  0090,  Multi-annual  programme  2010-2014  regarding  the  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice 
(Stockholm programme), paragraph 153. 
91 European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2011 on the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Main achievements and 
future challenges; European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on the European Union’s Internal Security Strategy 
((2010)  2308  (INI));  European  Parliament  resolution  of  11  September  2012  on  alleged  transportation  and  illegal 
detention of prisoners in European countries by the CIA: Follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP Committee 
Report (2012/2033(INI)); European Parliament resolution of 11 September 2012 on enhanced intra-EU solidarity in the 
field of asylum (2012/2032(INI)). 
CRIM 
The  Special  Committee  on  Organised  Crime, 
Corruption and Money Laundering (CRIM) was set up 
in March  2012  following  the  recommendation in  an 
own-initiative  report  from  October  2011.  In  this 
resolution,  rapporteur  Sonia  Alfano  called  for  a 
special committee to propose and develop a strategy 
on  the  fight  against  organised  crime,  mafias  and 
criminal systems in the EU. The CRIM Committee was 
established  for  one  year  but  its  activities  were 
extended  until  September  2013.  The  main  tasks  of 
CRIM are to analyse organised crime in Europe and 
to  assess  the  implementation  of  EU  policies  in  the 
fight against it, to scrutinise the role of EU agencies 
working on home affairs issues, and to hold hearings 
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procedure, to ensure that member states, at the request of EU institutions, suspend the adoption of laws 
suspected of disregarding fundamental rights or breaching the EU legal order.
92  
Perhaps one of the most visible institutional outputs of an EP own-initiative report has been the setting up of 
a sub-committee on crime-related domains. The EP resolution on organised crime in the EU called for the 
setting-up of a special committee on ‘mafia-style organised crime in the EU’.
93 This paved the way for the 
establishment  of  a  new  sub-committee  named  CRIM  (Organised  Crime,  Corruption  and  Money 
Laundering), which has been active since March 2012.
94 The CRIM Committee has recently delivered a 
Draft Final Report on organised crime, corruption and money laundering with recommendations on actions 
and initiatives to be taken, which aims at completing its one-and-a-half year work and is currently under 
negotiation.
95  
3.3.2  Follow up and consistency  
One of the challenges characterising the EP own-initiative reports and resolutions relates to the lack of 
consistent implementation of the EP policy initiatives. This dilemma not only applies to the fact that these 
instruments lack any legally binding nature, with the EP not holding a binding say in contrast to ordinary 
legislative procedure files, but there is also a lack of follow up by the European Commission and even 
sometimes by Parliament itself.  
3.3.2.1  The European Commission’s follow up 
The  inter-institutional  relations  between  the  EP  and  the  Commission  are  laid  down  in  the  Framework 
Agreement on relations between the two of November 2010,
96 which  establishes the  goal  of  effectively 
implementing a ‘special partnership’ and constructive dialogue between the two institutions. While regular 
dialogues and cooperation between the two institutions have been further developed since the beginning of 
2010, the specific ways in which the Commission follows up the Parliament’s own-initiative reports 
and  resolutions  constitutes  one  example  where  shortcomings  can  be  still  identified  and  further 
progress is necessary.  
According to Article 225 TFEU, the EP has been granted the power, acting with a majority of its component 
members, to request the Commission to submit a proposal on matters on which it considers that a Union act 
would be necessary for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. If the EP’s request is not followed and the 
Commission  does  not  submit  a  proposal,  it  is  under  obligation  to  inform  the  EP  of  the  main  reasons 
                                                   
92 See EP resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2010-2011), 12 December 2012. See 
Paragraph 20 of the Resolution which says that the cycle would detail “on a multiannual and yearly basis the objectives 
to be achieved and the problems to be solved; considers that this cycle should foresee a framework for institutions and 
the FRA, as well as member states, to work together by avoiding overlaps, building on each others' reports, taking joint 
measures  and  organising  joint  events  with  the  participation  of  NGOs,  citizens,  national  parliaments,  etc”.  The 
Resolution also called for the setting up of “a yearly interinstitutional forum in order to assess the EU fundamental 
rights situation” (paragraph 21). See also paragraph 31 on the mechanism and early warning system on fundamental 
rights monitoring. 
93 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2011 on organised crime in the European Union (2010/2309(INI)), 
paragraph 15. 
94 During its lifetime the Committee has organised +/- 24 meetings and 15 hearings with the participation of external 
experts, fact-finding visits to a number of EU and third countries and held an inter-parliamentary meeting with national 
parliaments,  see  the  CRIM  Newsletters 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/crim/newsletters.html#menuzone)  
95 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/crim/home.html  
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justifying this. As Craig (2013) has rightly noticed, “the European Parliament, however, accepted that it 
should be cautious in its use of this power”, and any request should emanate from an own-initiative report.
97  
This  has  been  further  specified  in  the  above-mentioned  Framework  Agreement  of  2010.  According  to 
paragraph  16  of  the  Framework  Agreement,  the  Commission  has  three  months  after  the  adoption  of  a 
Parliament Resolution to provide information in writing on actions taken in response to specific requests 
addressed to it in its resolutions, including in those cases where it has not been able to follow up on the 
Parliament’s views. This period may be shortened where a request is urgent. The Commission shall also 
commit itself to reporting on concrete follow ups of any request to submit a proposal on the basis of Article 
225 TFE (legislative initiative report) within three months of the adoption of the resolution in plenary. The 
Framework Agreement further states that  
The Commission shall  come  forward with a legislative proposal at the  latest after 1  year  or shall 
include  the  proposal  in  its  next  year’s  Work  Programme.  If  the  Commission  does  not  submit  a 
proposal, it shall give Parliament detailed explanations of the reasons.
98 
The  Commission  has  not  always  responded  satisfactorily  or  in  a  timely  manner  to  the  Parliament’s 
resolutions  and  initiatives  contained  therein.  For  instance,  the  EP  is  still  waiting  for  the  European 
Commission’s written reply to the above-mentioned proposals contained in the 2012 EP resolution on the 
situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2010-2011). Unsatisfactory responses have been also 
received to the EP reports and resolutions on EU counter-terrorism policies and the alleged transportation 
and illegal detention of prisoners in European countries by the CIA, where the Commission’s answers to 
Parliament’s  recommendations  and  calls  for  action  can  be  regarded  as  largely  inadequate,  with  the 
Commission too often referring to the limits of its legal competences as a way (or rather an excuse) to not to 
follow up the Parliament’s initiatives.
99 In sharp contrast, the Parliament’s LIBE Committee has only in 
extremely exceptional occasions rejected in full a Commission legislative proposal (see Section 3.4 below). 
The role of the EP as ‘policy setter and maker’ is further limited by information-sharing deficits. Room for 
the EP to be better informed by the Commission in the phases preceding a legislative proposal constitutes 
another issue of concern from the perspective of information-sharing deficits between the Commission and 
the EP in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting, in particular with regards to international agreements on JHA.
100 Rule 
39 of the EP Rules of Procedure (Access to Documents and Provision of Information to the EP) stipulates 
that the EP shall request access to all documents relating to proposals for legislative acts under the same 
conditions as the Council and its working parties and that  
“During the examination of a proposal for a legislative act, the committee responsible shall ask the 
Commission and the Council to keep it informed of the progress of that proposal in the Council and its 
                                                   
97 Craig, P. (2013) op. cit., page 33. 
98 Framework Agreement, op. cit., paragraph 16. 
99 The Commission’s brief written response to the recommendations put forward by the European Parliament resolution 
of 11 September 2012 on alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in European countries by the CIA: 
Follow-up  of  the  European  Parliament  TDIP  Committee  Report 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2012/2033%28INI%29)  constitutes  an 
excellent example illustrating this deficit. The Commission’s official answer was that this is an issue falling outside its 
legal competences. For a critical analysis of the this argument refer to S. Carrera, E. Guild, J. Soares da Silva and A. 
Wiesbrock (2012), The results of inquiries into the CIA's programme of extraordinary rendition and secret prisons in 
European states in light of the new legal framework following the Lisbon Treaty, Study for the European Parliament, 
DG IPOL, Brussels.  
100 According to the EP Activity Report (14 July 2009 – 31 December 2011): 
The Commission will provide full information and documentation on its meetings with national experts 
within the framework of its work on the preparation and implementation of Union legislation, including 
soft  law  and  delegated  acts.  If  so  requested  by  the  Parliament,  the  Commission  may  also  invite 
Parliament's experts to attend those meetings. THE ‘LISBONISATION’ OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  29 
 
working parties and in particular to inform it of any emerging compromises which will substantially 
amend the original proposal, or of the author's intention to withdraw its proposal”. 
However, this appears to not be fully satisfactory in practice, and lack of transparency and openness in 
Parliament-Commission relations has been signalled in our interviews. 
3.3.2.2  The EP and policy consistency checks 
In our research, we have also noticed a lack of follow up and consistency checks by the EP itself as regards 
the non-legislative and legislative contributions and policy agendas/initiatives on AFSJ-related policies. It is 
not clear how the policy initiatives and agendas set in own-initiative reports and resolutions relate to the 
LIBE’s work and position on specific legislative or international agreements files dealing with the same or 
related issues. An example of a lack of consistent follow up by the EP in its legislative activities relates to 
one of the most important policy paradigms which has been part of many EU policy debates since the 
9/11 events in the US, i.e. the need to strike ‘the right balance’ between freedom and security in EU JHA 
policies.
101  
Academic research has shown that such a ‘balancing act’ has actually favoured the development of a concept 
of security equal to coercion, surveillance, control and a whole series of practices of violence and exclusion 
at EU levels.
102 It has also legitimised claims about ‘collective security’, ‘global threats’ and ‘worst case 
scenario’ situations, which have too often led to policy measures and practices falling outside of the remits of 
democratic  accountability  and  posing  a  number  of  important  challenges  to  fundamental  rights  of 
individuals.
103 
Perhaps aware of the deficits inherent to the balance metaphor, and in line with the official abandonment of 
this concept by the European Council’s Stockholm Programme,
104 which instead underlined the need to 
ensure that law enforcement measures and those safeguarding individual rights, rule of law and international 
protection rules “go hand in hand in the same direction and are mutually reinforced”,
105 the 2009 EP 
Resolution on the Stockholm Programme also sustained a critical understanding of ‘the balance’. In its 
                                                   
101 The scholarly literature has critically assessed the ways in which the use of the ‘balance metaphor’ at EU levels has 
been driven by a misleading understanding of freedom and security are analogous concepts, which can be compared 
with and weighed against each other. The use of the balance has justified the development of EU security policies 
where individual freedoms and rights have been too often sacrificed in pros of ‘collective or State security’. For a 
critical account of the balance metaphor refer to D. Bigo, “Liberty, whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and the 
Conception  of  Freedom”,  in  T.  Balzacq  and  S.  Carrera  (eds)  (2006),  Security  versus  Freedom?  A  Challenge  for 
Europe’s Future, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 35–44.  
102 D. Bigo, S. Carrera, E. Guild and R.B.J. Walker (eds) (2010), Europe’s 21
st Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty, 
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. See also D. Bigo, S. Carrera, E. Guild and R.B.J. Walker (2008), “The Changing 
Landscape  of  European  Liberty  and  Security:  The  Mid-Term  Report  of  the  CHALLENGE  Project”,  International 
Social Science Journal, UNESCO, pp. 283-308. 
103 D. Bigo, S. Carrera and E. Guild (2009), “The Challenge Project: Final Policy Recommendations on the Changing 
Landscape of European Liberty and Security”, CHALLENGE Series Research Paper No. 14, CEPS, Brussels.  
104 In contrast with its predecessor – the 2004 Hague Programme, which incorporated the idea in the section entitled 
“Strengthening Freedom” stating that: “The European Council requests the Council to examine how to maximise the 
effectiveness and interoperability of EU information systems in tackling illegal immigration and improving border 
controls as well as the management of these systems on the basis of a communication by the Commission on the 
interoperability between the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information System (VIS) and EURODAC 
to be released in 2005, taking into account the need to strike the right balance between law enforcement purposes and 
safeguarding the fundamental rights of individuals.” 
105  Council  of  the  European  Union, The  Stockholm  Programme:  An  open  and  secure  Europe  serving the  citizen, 
17024/09, Brussels, 2 December 2009, p. 9. 30  CARRERA, HERNANZ & PARKIN  
 
Resolution, the Parliament underlined that security should  not be ‘balanced’  against rule of law  and 
fundamental rights, but rather must be pursued in accordance with the latter.
106  
The consistent application of this understanding of the relation between freedom and security appears 
to have become nuanced during the last three years of legislative activities by LIBE, even though it 
constituted a position of central importance for understanding the EP’s role in performing its democratic 
scrutiny  tasks  and  duties.  The  LIBE  Committee’s  green  light  to  the  EU-USA  TFPT  and  PNR 
agreements analysed in Section 3.1 above illustrates that where a policy approach is driven by the 
‘balance metaphor’, it can prove to be counter-productive in legislation concerning privacy and data 
protection, resulting in contradictions with the EP’s previously held position on these same issues.  
The  work  and  policy  outputs  of  the  above-mentioned  CRIM  Committee  represent  another  internal 
inconsistency challenge when evaluating the EP’s performance in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. By and 
large,  CRIM  has  worked  independently  from  the  legislative  and  policy  agenda  pursued  in  the  LIBE 
Committee, which has often led to unnecessary duplication and incoherencies in their respective policy 
approaches and work. The predominant ‘home affair, security and crime fighting-driven agenda’ of this 
Committee has placed at the margins the fundamental rights and rule of law repercussions inherent to the 
nature of the sensitive security policies that it has covered. This is obvious when reading the first draft of its 
2013 Report on organised crime, corruption, and money laundering
107 as well as the final draft published in 
June 2013. The Report includes few scattered, generic and unclear references to fundamental rights and 
rule of law implications, with no clear indications as to the ways in which these are to be effectively 
implemented  in  EU  organised  crime  methodologies  and  policies  by  the  relevant  EU  home  affairs 
agencies.
108 Furthermore, it is far from evident the extent to which the CRIM Committee has satisfactorily 
met its mandate, which called it to 
… ensure that Union law and policies are evidence-based and supported by the best available threat 
assessments, as well as to monitor  their compatibility with fundamental rights in accordance with 
Articles 2 and 6 of the Treaty on European Union, in particular the rights set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union
109 (Emphasis added). 
An additional issue of concern is the extent to which the initiatives and final recommendations put forward 
by the CRIM Committee Report correspond to those standing in the LIBE Committee, which is in fact 
the Parliamentary forum with primary competence in these areas, in particular in the legislative activities in 
these  same  domains.  The  CRIM  Committee  was  tasked  with  investigating  the  relationships  between 
organised crime, corruption and money laundering.
110 The Final Report and its activities have illustrated, 
                                                   
106 See paragraph 7 where the EP stressed that “… the EU is rooted in the principle of freedom; points out that, in 
support of that freedom, security must be pursued in accordance with the rule of law and subject to fundamental rights 
obligations;  states  that  the  balance  between  security  and  freedom  must  be  seen  from  this  perspective.  (Emphasis 
added).”  (www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2009-0090+0+DOC+XML 
+V0//EN)  
107 Draft Report on organised crime, corruption, and money laundering: recommendations on action and initiatives to be 
taken (interim report), 22.2.2013, CRIM_PR(2013)506051, rapporteur Salvatore Iacolino. 
108 DRAFT REPORT on organised crime, corruption and money laundering: recommendations on action and initiatives 
to  be  taken  (final  report),  CRIM_PR(2013)513067,  10.6.2013.  Available  at  www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0175&language=EN Amongst the few references to fundamental 
rights the following can be highlighted: First, paragraph 5 (EU proposals on criminal law must respect fundamental 
rights and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality); Second, paragraph 20 (wich acknowledges that border 
management  involves  a  migration  dimension  related  to  “the  fundamental  rights  of  migrants,  including,  where 
appropriate, the right to asylum”, and paragraph 24 (which calls for more efficient information sharing between law 
enforcement and judicial authorities at national and EU levels “in full compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and with EU fundamental rights”).  
109  Refer  to  Point  1.b  of  the  mandate  as  agreed  by  Parliament  in  March  2012.  Retrievable  from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-78 
110 Refer to www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-78  THE ‘LISBONISATION’ OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  31 
 
however,  that  the  Committee  has  turned  to  general  reflection  on  EU  police  and  judicial  cooperation, 
including deliberations on new Commission proposals and the post-Stockholm Programme agenda, which 
appear to go far beyond its mandate. 
A welcome initiative on EP internal policy coordination in the AFSJ has been recently launched by the LIBE 
Committee’s Secretariat. It follows up a previous Parliament Resolution on an EU approach to criminal law 
of May 2012,
111 and consists of the setting up of a Contact Group on Criminal Justice. The Group intends 
to bring together all the various rapporteurs at the EP working on criminal justice-related dossiers in order to 
ensure more consistency and coordination (including with the Council and the Commission) in the approach 
taken in current and near-future legislative proposals covering EU substantive criminal law. It is too early to 
know the extent to which the Contact Group will succeed in meeting its goals, however. The initiative 
presents  the  potential  for  positively  overcoming  the  unbalanced  security-driven  focus  that  has 
emerged from the CRIM Committee activities in these same policy domains. 
3.4  The European Parliament and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights  
As Section 2 of this Briefing Paper has illustrated, the EP LIBE Committee has played a key role as a 
promoter of fundamental rights and rule of law in the EU’s AFSJ legal edifice and cooperation. The EP 
LIBE Committee has consolidated its role and activities as a promoter of fundamental rights and rule of law 
in the EU AFSJ, and has ensured a horizontal coverage of fundamental rights considerations over all JHA 
policies falling under its conferred mandate. The previously mentioned EP Resolutions on the situation of 
fundamental rights in the EU constitute a case in point (Section 3.3.1 above). A key development in the 
Parliament’s  performance  in  a  post-Lisbon  Treaty  landscape,  however,  is  that  its  conversion  into  co-
legislator has caused it to face similar fundamental rights dilemmas to those experienced by the Council and 
the Commission, especially when legislating in security-related domains falling under the rubric of police 
and  criminal  justice  cooperation.  How  does  the  EP,  and  in  particular  its  LIBE  Committee,  ensure 
fundamental rights scrutiny in its own legislative work? There are a number of (ex ante) internal procedures 
and tools destined to fulfil this critical function, and which come in addition to the usual (ex post) safeguards 
guaranteed by the Treaties.
112 
Rule 36 of the EP Rules of  Procedure constitutes  the  main provision dealing  with the respect for the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU inside the Parliament’s work. The Rule states that the EP shall 
respect in all its activities the fundamental rights as laid down in the EU Charter, as well as the general 
principles stipulated in Articles 2 and 6 of the TEU. Furthermore, Rule 36.2 states that  
Where the Committee responsible for the subject matter, a political group or at least 40 Members are of 
the opinion that a proposal for a legislative act or parts of it do not comply with rights enshrined in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the matter shall, at their request, be referred to 
the committee responsible for the interpretation of the Charter. The opinion of that Committee shall be 
annexed to the report of the committee responsible for the subject matter. 
The Committee responsible for its implementation is the LIBE Committee. Indeed, in light of Annex VII 
(Powers and responsibilities of standing committees) of the EP Rules of Procedure, LIBE is in charge of “the 
protection  within  the  territory  of  the  Union  of  citizens'  rights,  human  rights  and  fundamental  rights, 
including the protection of minorities, as laid down in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
                                                   
111  www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0208&language=EN&ring=A7-2012-
0144 
112 Refer to ‘Human rights challenges of EU action’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (2011), EU Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials, Fifth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 372-381. 32  CARRERA, HERNANZ & PARKIN  
 
of the European Union”. Rule 36 has proven difficult to put into practice, however, as it requires simple 
majority voting in LIBE to proceed and it needs to be confirmed in Plenary.
113 
Yet,  the  case  of  the  Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) was one of the 
first  occasions  when  LIBE  successfully 
invoked  the  Rule  36  procedure  because  of 
its  tensions  with  the  EU  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights.  In  the  previously 
quoted EP 2012 Report on the situation of 
fundamental  rights  in  the  EU,  Parliament 
had  already  regretted  the  “the  lack  of 
transparency  and  openness,  as  well  as  of 
appropriate respect for, and protection and 
promotion  of,  fundamental  rights  and  of 
democratic and parliamentary oversight, in 
international  negotiations,  which  has  led 
Parliament  to  reject  international 
agreements such as ACTA, which will lead 
EU  institutions  and  Members  States  to 
change  their  current practices  and  respect 
citizens' rights”.
114  
                                                   
113 The interviews conducted revealed that it could be possible for MEPs concerned to send a request to the President of 
the EP who sends it back to LIBE for majority decision of LIBE Coordinators. Another option would be for the Chair of 
the LIBE Committee with the approval of the Committee of Coordinators. 
114 European Parliament (2012) Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2010 - 2011), 
Brussels, 22 November 2012, (2011/2069(INI)), Rapporteur: Monika Flašíková Beňová, paragraph 16. 
ACTA 
The  Anti-Counterfeiting  Trade  Agreement  (ACTA)  is 
an  international  agreement  negotiated  between  the 
EU,  its  member  states  and  ten  other  countries  on 
international  enforcement  of  intellectual  property 
rights. The EU signed ACTA in January 2012, but in 
order  to  enter  into  force  the  agreement  required 
consent  from  the  European  Parliament.  The  lead 
committee  in  the  European  Parliament  was  the 
International Trade (INTA) committee, but four other 
committees  also  drafted  a  report  on  ACTA.  Among 
them, the LIBE Committee was in charge of reporting 
on  the  compatibility  of  ACTA  with  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental Rights, pursuant to Rule 36(2) of the EP 
rules  of procedures.  In  the case  of  ACTA, it was  a 
political group (the Greens/EFA) which invoked Rule 
36  that  ultimately  resulted  in  LIBE  adopting  an 
opinion rejecting ACTA. All the other committees also 
voted negatively which led to the EP plenary voting 
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During the 7
th legislature, there has been 
only  one  example  of  the  LIBE 
Committee  rejecting  a  Commission 
draft legislative proposal on the basis of 
the  tensions  that  it  poses  from  a 
fundamental  rights  and  proportionality 
viewpoint. This related to an  initiative 
for  the  setting  up  of  an  EU  PNR 
system.
115  The  proposal,  which  was 
negotiated  inside  the  EP  by  MEP 
Timothy  Kirkhope  as  rapporteur,  was 
rejected  in  April  2013.
116  The  main 
concerns expressed by several MEPs 
who welcomed the rejection vote was 
the  incompatibility  of  the  initiative 
with fundamental rights (in particular, 
the  protection  of  privacy  and  data 
protection  as  envisaged  in  the  EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights) as well 
as the disproportionate  nature of  its 
publicly  intended  goals  (including 
mass surveillance and profiling), with not enough evidence provided on its usefulness and necessity.
117 The 
final destiny of the EU PNR system remains uncertain, as Parliament’s Plenary has sent the proposal back to 
the LIBE Committee ‘for further consideration’ in accordance with Rule 175 of its Rules of Procedure. This 
constitutes a unique case where the LIBE Committee has rejected ‘in full’ a Commission legislative 
proposal falling under the rubric of ‘judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ and ‘police cooperation’ 
due to fundamental rights considerations.  
Another route for conducting fundamental rights control in the EP’s internal legislative work is foreseen by 
Rule  126  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure.  This  provision  envisages  the  possibility  for  the  EP  to  ask  EU 
Agencies,  including  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Fundamental  Rights  (FRA)  or  the  European  Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), for advice,  including  on fundamental rights compliance  of EP legislative 
amendments and agreements. Rule 126 does not foresee any limitation as regards the specific AFSJ policy 
domain. This  has been  of particular relevance to the FRA’s current  mandate, which  does  not cover the 
former  EU  Third  Pillar  (police  and  criminal  justice  cooperation).
118  That  notwithstanding,  Parliament’s 
requests have allowed the FRA to informally extend its thematic remit towards EU legislative proposals 
covering (old Third Pillar) security and criminal justice domains. A number of opinions have been issued by 
                                                   
115 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive  of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use  of 
Passenger  Name  Record  data  for  the  prevention,  detection,  investigation  and  prosecution  of  terrorist  offences  and 
serious crime, COM(2011) 32 final, Brussels, 2 February 2011. For a critical analysis refer to E. Brouwer (2011), 
“Ignoring Dissent and Legality: The EU’s Proposal to Share the Personal Information of all Passengers”, CEPS Liberty 
and Security Series in Europe, Brussels. 
116  www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20130422IPR07523/html/Civil-Liberties-Committee-rejects-
EU-Passenger-Name-Record-proposal  
117  See  for  instance  the  following  Press  Releases:  www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/newsroom/eupnr-citizens-data-
protection-must-be-strengthened and www.greens-efa.eu/passenger-dataprivacy-pnr-9716.html  
118 Council of the European Union, Council Decision establishing a Multiannual Framework for 2013-2017 for the 
European  Union  Agency  for  Fundamental  Rights,  10449/12,  Brussels,  13  June  2012 
(http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st10/st10449.en12.pdf) and Council of the European Union, Note on the 
Proposal  for  a  Council  Decision  establishing  a  Multiannual  Framework  for  the  European  Union  Agency  for 
Fundamental Rights for 2013–2017 – Requesting the consent of the European Parliament, Brussels, 13 May 2012 
(http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st10/st10615.en12.pdf). 
EU PNR system 
In the context of the negotiations on the agreement 
with  the  United  States  on  the  transmission  of  PNR 
data  (see  Section  3.1  above),  the  European 
Commission proposed a proper PNR system for the 
EU  in February  2011.  The  objective  of  the  EU  PNR 
system is  to  oblige  airlines  to  transmit  passengers’ 
data to member states’ authorities for the purposes 
of  fighting  serious  crime  and  terrorism.  Inside  the 
LIBE Committee, MEP Timothy Kirkhope (ECR Group) 
was appointed as rapporteur on this file. His report, 
however,  was  rejected  by  the  LIBE  Committee  in 
April 2013 by 30 votes to 25. This vote came as a 
surprise to many MEPs and advisors interviewed for 
this briefing paper. In the June 2013 plenary session 
of the EP, the rejected report was sent back to the 
LIBE  Committee  following  a  request  by  rapporteur 
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the FRA following requests by LIBE. These have included opinions on issues such as the confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime in December 2012,
119 the proposed Data Protection Package,
120 the PNR Directive,
121 or 
the draft Directive on the European Investigation Order
122 of February 2011.  
Our interviews have revealed that the EP’s Legal Service role has increased in AFSJ-related legislative 
dossiers in the post-Lisbon Treaty context. The EP Legal Service has often been asked for advice in 
relevant files, some of which have included an internal assessment of fundamental rights concerns raised by 
specific initiatives or amendments to legislative dossiers.  
That  notwithstanding,  the  actual 
impact  that  these  instruments  and 
opinions  have  on  preventing 
fundamental  rights  dilemmas  in  the 
EP’s  own  legislative  work  is  not 
clear. Their limits have been shown, 
for  instance,  in  relation  to  the  EP 
work on the Commission proposal for 
a  Directive  on  the  freezing  and 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime 
in the EU.
123 Opinions from the EP 
Legal service and the FRA revealed 
concerns  regarding  the  fundamental 
rights  aspects  of  the  EP’s 
amendments to the text,
124 but these 
were  not  taken  on  board  by  the 
rapporteur. This file  has also shown 
the  negative influence  of the above-
mentioned  CRIM  Committee.  The 
latter  organised  a  hearing  on  the 
Protection  of  Financial  Interests  of 
the  Union  before  the  LIBE 
Committee  had  even  appointed  a 




This resulted in several amendments to the Commission proposal by then rapporteur Macovei (EPP-RO) in 
which possibilities for confiscation were extended beyond the context of criminal proceedings to allow the 
confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities without a criminal conviction where a court is satisfied, on the 
basis of specific circumstances and all the available evidence that those assets derive from activities of a 
criminal  nature.  This  system  would  have  opened  the  door  to  the  confiscation  of  goods  without  an 
                                                   
119 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-opinion-3-2012_confiscation-of-proceeds-of-crime.pdf  
120 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-opinion-data-protection-oct-2012.pdf  
121 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1786-FRA-PNR-Opinion-2011_EN.pdf  
122 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1490-FRA-Opinion-EIO-Directive-15022011.pdf  
123  European  Commission  (2012)  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament and  of  the  Council  on  the 
freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union, COM(2012) 85 final, Brussels, 12 March 2012.  
124  See  the  FRA  opinion  at  http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-opinion-3-2012_confiscation-of-proceeds-of-
crime.pdf - the EP Legal Service’s opinion has not been made public. 
125  The  hearing  was  organised  on  28  November  2012,  see  the  programme  at  www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/crim/dv/hearingprogramme28november2012_/hearingprogramme28november2012_e
n.pdf 
Freezing and confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime 
In March 2012, the European Commission published 
a  proposal  for  a  directive  on  the  freezing  and 
confiscation  of  the  proceeds  of  crime  in  the  EU. 
According  to  the  Commission,  the  purpose  of  this 
proposal was to make it easier for member states “to 
confiscate and recover the profits that criminals make 
from cross-border serious and organised crime”. The 
LIBE  Committee  in  the  European  Parliament 
appointed  Monica  Luisa  Macovei  (EPP  Group)  as 
rapporteur for this file in April 2012. Following heated 
debates inside and outside the LIBE Committee, and 
the publication of critical opinions by the FRA and the 
EDPS on the fundamental rights aspects of the text, 
the  report was eventually  adopted in May  2013  by 
the LIBE Committee with 48 votes for, 7 against and 
2  abstentions.  Several  experts  interviewed  for  this 
briefing  note  have  noted  that  the  main  issue  of 
controversy was the fact that the report extends the 
notion of confiscation beyond the context of criminal 
proceedings to allow the confiscation of the proceeds 
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underlying criminal conviction or criminal proceedings that could not lead to such a conviction due to the 
death,  illness  of  flight  of  the  suspect.  The  EP  rapporteur’s  position  did  not  change  even  though  it 
contradicted the opinions of the EP legal service, the FRA and even the Council legal service, which 
stated that this would not be in accordance with the legal basis pertaining to judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, criminal law (articles 82 and 83 TFEU), even if certain member states may have such systems in 
place.  
The ways in which fundamental rights compliance is ensured throughout the EU policy cycle remains 
a policy challenge, including  for  the EP  itself. Both the European Commission and the Council  have 
published internal strategies on the respect of fundamental rights.
126 A new development which may have 
positive implications in internal fundamental rights screening and monitoring has been the setting up of a 
new  Impact  Assessment  and  European  Added  Value  Directorate  G  (DG  IPOL)  inside  the  EP, 
established in January 2012. It counts with specific units for Impact Assessment and for European Added 
Value,  together  with  responsibility  for  Science  and  Technology  Options  Assessment  (STOA)  and  other 
aspects  of  forward  policy  assessment.
127  The  role  that  this  Directorate  will  play  in  improving  the  EP’s 
capacity to carry out policy assessment will be central. The services provided include the provision of in-
house appraisals of Commission Impact Assessments and carrying out complementary IA in those cases 
“where  proposals  have  no  Commission  Impact  Assessment  or  where  the  assessment  is  not 
comprehensive”.
128  This  will  be  complemented  with  ‘European  Added  Value’  (EAV)  Assessments  to 
evaluate  the  potential  impact  of  legislative  initiative  reports  to  be  put  forward  by  the  Parliament  under 
Article 225 TFEU.  
The setting up of the Directorate G in DG IPOL constitutes a welcome development with clear institutional 
value. However, the ways in which fundamental rights-related evaluation aspects will be carried out 
and taken consistently and horizontally in the scope of internal IA and EAV assessments are unclear 
at present. Close linkages with the LIBE Committee would be also necessary and welcomed. This was also 
highlighted by the above-mentioned Parliament 2012 Resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the 
EU, which called for the Parliament to “strengthen its autonomous impact assessment on fundamental rights 
in relation to legislative proposals and amendments under examination in the legislative process and make it 
more systematic”.
129  
4.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
4.1  Conclusions 
The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the EP has meant its realisation as an AFSJ decision-maker and institutional 
co-owner. Democratic accountability has been finally placed at the foundations of European cooperation on 
AFSJ-related policy domains. This Briefing Paper has examined the progress, shortcomings and challenges 
experienced by the EP from the  entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty until  mid-2013 in JHA domains. 
Particular attention has been paid to its legislative and policy-shaping powers. During this three-year period, 
the Parliament’s Committee responsible for civil liberties, justice and home affairs – the LIBE Committee – 
has demonstrated highly active and dynamic progress in adapting to its newly recognised post-Lisbon roles.  
                                                   
126 See European Commission (2010) Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
by  the  European  Union,  COM(2010)  573  final,  Brussels,  19.10.2010; as  well  as  Council  of  the EU  (2011)  Draft 
conclusions on the role of the Council of the European Union in ensuring the effective implementation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Council document 6387/11, Brussels, 11 February 2011.  
127  www.europarl.europa.eu/the-secretary-general/en/activities/recent_activities/articles/articles-2012/articles-2012-
october/articles-2012-october-2.html  
128 The Directorate will outsource IA on substantive amendments being considered by a Parliamentary Committee (such 
assessments are always prepared by outside experts). 
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The  EP’s  contributions  to  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure  have  transformed  the  classical  ways 
decisions on JHA used to be shaped and taken at the EU level. LIBE has been successful in navigating 
the new inter-institutional decision-making processes and actors and ensuring a higher degree of democratic 
scrutiny in EU AFSJ decision-making. This has materialised in concrete and visible inputs into the actual 
content of adopted EU AFSJ legislation, a higher degree of democratic scrutiny in EU AFSJ cooperation, 
and the  development  of  new  working  methods and  practices  in the conduct  of  negotiations of complex 
legislative dossiers. During the 7
th Legislature, the LIBE Committee has positioned itself amongst the EP 
Committees holding the highest proportion of legislative dossiers and files subject to the ordinary legislative 
procedure. 
This  Briefing  Paper  has  identified  a  number  of  developments  and  challenges  in  respect  to  the  LIBE 
Committee’s legislative and policy-shaping/setting powers which – in order to foster innovation in upcoming 
EU institutional and policy configurations as from 2014 – call for critical reflection and consideration. A first 
key finding  has been that the  Parliament’s  new Treaty-based competences, in particular those falling 
within the remits of classical EU security policies (policing and criminal justice cooperation) and in both 
their internal and international relations dimensions, have experienced fierce struggles with the Council 
and the European Commission. These inter-institutional disputes have most importantly revealed that there 
is still some way to go for the actual practices and mindsets of Council and Commission’s representatives to 
duly acknowledge and internalise the new standing of the Parliament as co-legislator in AFSJ cooperation. 
The EP is at the same time also struggling in its search for its own identity as AFSJ co-owner and 
legislator and its new position in the driving seat for decisions in of security-related policies.  
Its long-standing strategic activism to have its role and powers recognised in the AFSJ, and its progressively 
attributed  ‘accountability  competences’  strengthened  and  properly  implemented  by  its  JHA  institutional 
colleagues, has continued during the post-Lisbon Treaty phasing. Controversies, such as those relating to the 
first voting down of the EU-US SWIFT agreement or the so-called ‘Schengen Freeze’, constitute a few 
visible examples of the Parliament seeking recognition of its authority chiefly before the Council. This has 
been accompanied by strategies on the part of the EP to be regarded by the Council and the Commission as a 
trusted and legitimate co-legislator. This Briefing Paper has argued that it is perhaps in this process of 
searching its legitimacy that the Parliament, and more particularly the LIBE Committee, has found itself 
with a fundamental dilemma that remains largely unresolved. 
The  somehow  artificial  framing  of  the  LIBE  Committee  as  ‘controversial’,  ‘lacking  seriousness  and 
responsibility’  or  ‘left  wing’  because  of  its  pre-Lisbon  Treaty  calls  for  more  democratic  accountability, 
transparency,  fundamental  rights  and  rule  of  law  in  JHA  cooperation  has  been  largely  misleading  and 
counterproductive for the process of its adaptation as co-legislator. One of the arguments put forward by this 
Briefing  Paper  is  that  these  past  framings  are  not  helpful  in  evaluating  the  EP  AFSJ  legislative 
performance in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting and when moving towards the next phase of democratic 
accountability of the EU AFSJ. They are in fact erroneous, as LIBE’s recognised competences in the EP 
Rules  of  Procedure  are  intrinsically  related  to  democratic  scrutiny,  proportionality  and  fundamental 
rights  protection,  which  should  not  be  dependent  upon  any  specific  ideological  (left,  centre  or  right) 
tendency or parliamentary group, but rather constitute the basis for the liberal democratic principles upon 
which the Union, and the work of its institutional organs, is anchored.  
That  notwithstanding,  the  increasing  pressures  and  strong  lobbying  by  Council,  rotating  Presidencies, 
member state governments and the European Commission in Parliamentary legislative work have somehow 
succeeded in transmitting a message that after acquiring its role of decision-making in JHA, the Parliament 
needs to behave well, act ‘seriously’ and ‘non-confrontationally’, and hence go along with the Council’s and 
the Commission’s traditional ways of working. Our analysis demonstrates that this has led to the emergence 
of technocratic practices in the form of informal paths of decision-making inside the EP, such as early 
informal agreements and confidential compromise-making, which form a difficult relationship with the 
very  principles  of  democratic  accountability  and  transparency  that  the  Parliament  purports  to  hold,  and 
negatively affect the consistency of its policy-making initiatives and corresponding legislative activities 
and outputs. Our analysis has also shown that, while the LIBE Committee can count upon a number of 
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of the EP at large, their underdeveloped and scattered nature poses limitations to their full and mainstreamed 
application.  
4.2  Policy recommendations to the European Parliament 
While it can be concluded that the Parliament has achieved impressive progress in its new role as AFSJ actor 
and co-legislator, there are still a number of issues and shortcomings which call for closer attention and 
action. The EP has still to fully adapt to its recognised Treaty powers and growing legislative and policy-
shaper/setter roles developed in its Rules of Procedures, and to make a strategic appraisal of its competences. 
This will constitute a decisive factor in ensuring its democratic oversight in legislative procedures at the EU 
level and strengthen the legitimacy of its actions and decisions before the peoples of Europe. 
The  EP  should  adopt  an  internal  horizontal  ‘accountability,  transparency  and  fundamental  rights 
strategy’. A central priority for the post-2014 AFSJ from the perspective of the EP should be to develop 
new/innovative  ways  of  implementing  its  working  methods  ensuring  solid  and  horizontal  democratic 
accountability of its own legislative activities and procedures, a stronger consistency checking between its 
policy-setting priorities and those bestowed in legislative files, and a stronger horizontal mainstreaming of 
fundamental rights protection and monitoring during the development of its legislative interventions and 
outputs, as well as ex post. This strategy should be guided by the following specific priorities: 
1.  More  accountable,  transparent  and  less  technocratic  decision-making  in  ordinary  legislative 
procedure. The informal and early agreements in the ordinary legislative procedures should be limited and 
subject to closer internal scrutiny and transparency criteria. This should not only include a more effective 
implementation  (and  monitoring)  of  the  current  set  of  internal  EP  guidelines  and  codes  of  conduct  of 
application in the development of ‘trilogues’ and conclusion of early and first reading agreements in the 
ordinary legislative procedure. It should also mean the opening of more venues for political debate inside the 
LIBE  Committee.  The  Recommendations  of  the  2008  EP  Working  Party  on  Parliamentary  Reform  are 
particularly welcome and should be followed up effectively and further implemented.  
The  implementation  of  flexible  and  ‘efficient’  ways  of  working  in  line  with  the  negotiation  cultures 
developed by the Council and the Commission might be necessary for trustful inter-institutional relations, 
but  they  should  not  undermine  the  political  accountability,  debate  and  scrutiny  roles  with  which  the 
Parliament is being entrusted by the Treaties and its Rules of Procedures. The EP is now in a position to 
develop its own legislative identity which, by its very nature, forms a difficult relationship with convenience, 
lack of controversy and rapidity in EU decision-making procedures. This identity has been closely anchored 
in  the  Treaties  and  its  Rules  Procedure  to  the  delivery  of  effective  democratic  accountability  and 
fundamental rights/rule of law monitoring, and consolidation should continue in that direction 
All  the  main  decisions  and  agreements  by  the  actors  involved  inside  the  EP  (e.g.  rapporteurs,  shadow 
rapporteurs,  and  relevant  internal  coordination  committees),  and  in  their  relations  with  the  Presidency, 
Council and Commission, should be fully accessible to all the members of LIBE as well as to the public at 
large. This should include the four/multi-column working document summarising the positions of each of the 
actors.  The  lobbying  by  member  state  governments  (or  any  other  third-party  government)  for  ongoing 
Parliamentary legislative work should become subject to special and closer scrutiny, as it may undermine the 
independence of Parliament to safeguard the interests of citizens and those of the EU at large (not those of 
specific national governments) and might also disrupt ‘the balance’ of EU inter-institutional negotiations. 
While  it  should  be  assumed  that  this  lobbying  practice  will  continue  and  cannot  be  prevented  (indeed, 
knowledge of member states' positions may even facilitate the EP's leverage during negotiations), the EP 
should  amend  its  Code  of  Conduct  to  guarantee  that  legislative  inputs  resulting  from  member  states’ 
lobbying  efforts  are  openly  debated  in  the  LIBE  Committee.  Rapporteurs and  co-rapporteurs  could,  for 
instance, be subject to the obligation to divulge the origin of legislative amendments that result more or less 
directly from interventions by permanent representations. The EP should also call for more transparency 
from the Council as regards the negotiation positions of member states during trialogues, which are often not 
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Moreover,  LIBE  should  continue  to  develop,  and  perhaps  exercise  less  cautiously,  the  competences 
conferred upon it as co-legislator. This could mean, for instance, daring to express complete disagreement 
and  launching  critical  democratic  debate  on  the  Council’s  negotiating  positions  and  the  Commission’s 
legislative  initiatives  from  the  perspective  of  their  added  value,  proportionality  and  fundamental  rights 
compliance in light of its tasks envisaged in the EP Rules of Procedure. This could be accompanied by the 
development of a more dynamic attitude in requesting the Commission to submit legislative proposals on 
matters where it considers Union instruments would be necessary to implement the Treaties.  
2. Stronger follow up and internal policy consistency checking. The Parliament should develop and put 
into practice closer scrutiny of the Commission’s follow up responses to initiatives and recommendations 
expressed in the EP’s own-initiative reports and resolutions. Particular attention should be paid here to a 
more effective strategy for Parliament to be better informed by the Commission about the latter’s legislative 
and working planning, including ongoing negotiations on AFSJ international agreements. 
Internal policy consistency has been identified as a matter for concern in this Briefing Paper. Stronger links 
should  be  ensured  between  the  positions  and  recommendations  put  forward  by  non-ordinary  legislative 
procedure instruments and those where Parliament is a partner in co-decision and international agreements 
files. This should include, for instance, building upon its critical appraisal of the balance metaphor between 
freedom and security principle as upheld in its 2009 Resolution on the Stockholm Programme. Security 
should not be balanced against rule of law and fundamental rights, but rather be pursued in accordance with 
the latter and under proper and full democratic scrutiny.  
Experiences such as that of the CRIM Committee show how an exclusive ‘home affairs or security-oriented’ 
understanding of AFSJ policies is inadequate to satisfactorily reconcile security with liberty predicaments in 
EU  cooperation. The CRIM Committee  interim activities  have  moved to the  margins the  liberty-related 
considerations and rule of law implications of any crime-fighting policy of a national or supranational nature. 
The findings and recommendations contained in its draft Report provide no clear indications of the ways in 
which high-quality evaluation of threat assessments and fundamental rights protection of EU crime fighting 
policies  and  agencies  work  will  be  ensured  in  practice.  It  appears  to  have  created  duplications  and 
inconsistency  tensions  with  the  legislative  work  carried  out  by  the  LIBE  Committee  in  EU  police  and 
judicial cooperation from both their substantive and institutional sides.  
The CRIM Committee experience has, perhaps most importantly, shown that an internal splitting of the 
LIBE Committee into two,  mimicking the  current European Commission’s DGs separation (DG Justice, 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship and DG Home Affairs), could prove to be counterproductive in ensuring 
policy consistency and fundamental rights horizontal monitoring in Parliament’s AFSJ work. 
As regards EU AFSJ policy programming, and as the post-Stockholm Programme affair has revealed, the 
European Council is no longer the exclusive owner of JHA programming and there is no need for a new 
multi-annual document succeeding the Stockholm Programme as from 2014. The Parliament should instead 
implement its own policy strategies.
130 A priority could be to put Article 17 TFEU into effect and initiate 
“the Union’s annual and multiannual programming with a view to achieving inter-institutional agreements”. 
A consultation process between the EP and the two relevant Commission DGs should be started as soon as 
possible, in order to find agreement on common initiatives and general priorities to be included in their 
respective policy and legislative agendas for the post-Stockholm Programme phase. The EP should also 
display closer follow up and scrutiny of the planning and implementation of the Commission’s future Annual 
Work Programmes on EU AFSJ, from the perspective of the Parliament’s own priorities, initiatives and 
recommendations.  
                                                   
130 The LIBE Committee is currently working (together with AFCO and JURI Committees) on a new Report on the 
Mid-Term Evaluation of the Stockholm Programme, and the rapporteur is Juan Fernando López Aguilar. Refer to 
European Parliament, Working Document on the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Stockholm Programme, 13.5.2013. The 
Report aims at evaluating the achievements reached so far, identify the missing elements and propose a way forward for 
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3. Horizontal and mainstreamed fundamental rights monitoring. The EP should continue to develop and 
consolidate its tradition and competence in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights monitoring. An ‘internal 
fundamental rights strategy’ should be adopted before the start of the 8
th Parliamentary Legislature. This 
should include more active fundamental rights scrutiny of European Commission proposals and international 
agreements on AFSJ domains (in close cooperation with EU Agencies such as the FRA and the EDPS), as 
well  as  of  the  fundamental  rights  implications  of  its  own  substantive  legislative  contributions  and 
amendments/agreements in the conduct of legislative procedures. The application of Rule 36 of the Rules of 
Procedures has proved useful in the particular case of ACTA, but remains too rigid in nature for its full 
effectiveness to be guaranteed in practice during the legislative procedure. Rule 36 should be accompanied 
by guidelines on its current modalities of application. This could also include a revision of the procedure in 
order to facilitate its activation during the legislative procedure and prevent situations such as that which 
occurred  during  the  negotiations  on  the  Commission  proposal  on  the  confiscation  and  freezing  of  the 
proceeds of crime. In particular, the possibility of liberalising its application could be explored by amending 
the  current  voting  requirements  (which  at  present  call  for  a  simple  majority  voting  decision  in  the 
Committee),  reducing  the  required  threshold  to  a  vote  by  one-tenth  of  the  members  of  the  LIBE 
Committee.
131  
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Annex 1. Statistics on the European Parliament’s Activities, 2009-2014 
Parliamentary Reports tabled by committees during 7
th parliamentary term (2009-2014), last updated 17 June 2013 






APP   Total: 
legislative 





TOTAL  TOTAL 
  % 
Delegations (+BUDE)           7     7  1        1  8  0.5% 
(AFET)  1  4  1     10  16     61  1  62  78  5.0% 
(DEVE)  2  3  2     3  10     27     27  37  2.4% 
(INTA)  6  41  5     44  96     15  1  16  112  7.1% 
(BUDG)  2  5  1     2  10  145  3  3  151  161  10.2% 
(CONT)  27  1           28  185  11     196  224  14.2% 
(ECON)  32  47        2  81     42  1  43  124  7.9% 
(EMPL)  4  14  1        19     26     26  45  2.9% 
(ENVI)   2  51  8     4  65     26     26  91  5.8% 
(ITRE)  17  22  4     11  54     26     26  80  5.1% 
(IMCO)     30  3        33     31     31  64  4.1% 
(TRAN)  2  23  8     17  50     17     17  67  4.3% 
(REGI)   7  6           13     23     23  36  2.3% 
(AGRI)  4  26  3        33     18     18  51  3.2% 
(PECH)  2  26  1     14  43     9     9  52  3.3% 
(CULT)  1  3  1     3  8     22     22  30  1.9% 
(JURI)  13  37  1     5  56     31  38  69  125  7.9% 
(LIBE)   26  32  7     22  87     14     14  101  6.4% 
(AFCO)  6  2        4  12     9  17  26  38  2.4% 
(FEMM)     3  2        5     30     30  35  2.2% 
(PETI)                       11     11  11  0.7% 
Special Committees                       4     4  4  0.3% 
TOTAL  154  376  48  7  141  726  331  456  61  848  1574  100% 
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Reference  Subject  Type of Action  Result 
12 July 2010  5 September 
2012 
C-355/10 - Parliament v 
Council  
Schengen Borders Code - Decision 
2010/252/EU - Surveillance of the sea 
external borders - Introduction of additional 
rules governing border surveillance - 
Commission’s implementing powers 
Action for 
annulment under 
Article 263 TFEU 
Court annulled Council Decision 
2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 
supplementing the Schengen Borders 
Code as regards the surveillance of the 
sea external borders in the context of 
operational cooperation coordinated by 
the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the member 
states of the European Union; 
 
The Court maintains the effects of 
decision 2010/252 until the entry into 




19 July 2012  C-130/10 - Parliament v 
Council 
Common foreign and security policy - 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 - Regulation 
(EU) No 1286/2009 - Restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities 
associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-
Qaeda network and the Taliban - Freezing of 
funds and economic resources - Choice of 
legal basis - Articles 75 TFEU and 215 
TFEU - Entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon - Transitional provisions - CFSP 
common positions and decisions - Joint 
proposal from the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and from the Commission. 
Action for 
annulment under 
Article 263 TFEU 
The Court dismissed the action 
 




6 May 2008  C-133/06 - Parliament v 
Council 
Common policy on asylum - Directive 
2005/85/EC - Procedures in member states 
for granting and withdrawing refugee status - 
Safe countries of origin - European safe third 
countries - Minimum common lists - 
Procedure for adopting or amending the 
minimum common lists - Article 67(1) and 
first indent of Article 67(5) EC - No power. 
Action for 
annulment under 
Article 230 EC 
 
The Court annulled Articles 29(1) and 
(2) and 36(3) of Council Directive 
2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on 
minimum standards on procedures in 
member states for granting and 





C-403/05 - Parliament v 
Commission 
Commission decision approving a project 
relating to border security in the Philippines - 
Decision adopted on the basis of Regulation 
(EEC) No 443/92 - Commission’s 
implementing powers - Limits. 
Action for 
annulment under 
Article 230 EC 
 
The Court annulled the decision of the 
Commission approving a project relating 
to border security in the Republic of the 
Philippines to be financed by budget line 
19 10 02 in the general budget of the 
European Communities (Philippines 
Border Management Project, No 
ASIA/2004/016-924) 
27 July 2004  30 May 2006  Joined cases C-317/04 
and C-318/04 - 
Parliament v 
 Council (C-317/04) and 
Commission (C-318/04) 
Protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data - Air transport - 
Decision 2004/496/EC - Agreement between 
the European Community and the United 
States of America - Passenger Name Records 
of air passengers transferred to the United 
States Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection - Directive 95/46/EC - Article 25 - 
Third countries - Decision 2004/535/EC - 
Adequate level of protection. 
Actions for 
annulment under 
Article 230 EC 
 
The Court annulled Council Decision 
2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 on the 
conclusion of an Agreement between the 
European Community and the United 
States of America on the processing and 
transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to 
the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection, and Commission 
Decision 2004/535/EC of 14 May 2004 
on the adequate protection of personal 
data contained in the Passenger Name 
Record of air passengers transferred to 




27 June 2006  C-540/03 - Parliament v 
Council 
Immigration policy - Right to family 
reunification of minor children of third 
country nationals - Directive 2003/86/EC - 
Protection of fundamental rights - Right to 
respect for family life - Obligation to have 
regard to the interests of minor children. 
Action for 
annulment under 
Article 230 EC 






Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely recognised as 
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